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THE MAKING OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT LAWS,
1870-1872*
XI WANG**
The Fifteenth Amendment represented the highest achievement
of the Republican party's Reconstruction politics. By prohibiting the
national and state governments from depriving citizens of the right to
vote on the basis of race, color, and previous condition of servitude,
the Amendment conferred suffrage on newly emancipated African-
American men, thus constitutionalizing the principle and practice of
black suffrage which was first established in early 1867. Black partici-
pation in Reconstruction not only helped to consolidate the outcomes
of the Civil War and congressional Reconstruction, but it also rede-
fined the course of American democracy. In order to maintain the
vitality and validity of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Republican
party had to permanently and effectively implement that Amendment
in the South, where anti-black suffrage forces mounted high.
Between May 1870 and June 1872, the Republican-controlled
Congress passed five laws to implement the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Three of these laws were known as the "Enforcement
Acts" or "Force Acts." Two of the three "Force Acts" dealt directly
with the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. The other "Force
Act" and the other two federal laws dealt with other issues, but none-
theless contained provisions that concerned enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. These enforcement acts represented the
Republican party's effort to give concrete meaning to the Fifteenth
Amendment, to provide federal machinery for implementing the
Amendment, and to establish a uniform system of supervision and en-
forcement at national elections. Constitutionally speaking, these en-
forcement laws marked the beginning of the infrastructure of modern
state power.' Although the Republican party maintained a dominant
* This article will appear in Professor Xi Wang's forthcoming book, BLACK SUFFRAGE
AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1865-1891 (copyright © 1996 by The University of Georgia
Press). Chicago-Kent Law Review is printing this article with the permission of The University
of Georgia Press.
** Assistant Professor of History, Indiana University of Pennsylvania. I also wish to thank
the University of Georgia Press for permitting the use of this article.
1. The five laws to be discussed in this Paper are: (1) Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat.
140 (enforcing voting rights of U.S. citizens); (2) Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254
(amending naturalization laws); (3) Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (amending Act of
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majority in both Houses when these laws were debated, the passage of
these laws did not come easily. This Paper examines the historical
background of making the enforcement laws; documents the legisla-
tive history of these laws; analyzes how the Republican legal and
political minds understood and interpreted the meanings of such Re-
construction establishments as black freedom and political equality;
and discusses how the intra-party debates affected the quality of fed-
eral enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment.
I. ADOPTION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
ENSUING PROBLEMS
Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment on February 26, 1869,
and immediately submitted it to the states for ratification. The New
England and the Northwestern states promptly approved the Amend-
ment. Bitter fights over ratification occurred in large industrial states
such as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois, but eventually
they all ratified the Amendment. The Amendment was rejected by
the states with large non-white populations, especially border states
and the Far West, but it was ratified by ten Southern states. On March
30, 1870, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish announced that the Fif-
teenth Amendment had become law. 2
In the Northern populace, the passage and ratification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment produced the feeling that the long struggle against
American slavery had finally come to an end. During April and May
1870, blacks throughout the country celebrated the ratification of the
May 31, 1870); (4) Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (enforcing provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment); and (5) Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 415, 17 Stat. 347 (appropriation for Sun-
dry civil expenses of the government). The first and third laws specifically deal with the
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, while the other three laws contain provisions to en-
force black suffrage. In this Paper, for the convenience of discussion, I will call all of these laws
Enforcement Acts, although I am perfectly aware that the traditional use of "Force Acts" indi-
cates only the first, third, and fourth laws listed above.
2. Altogether, twenty-nine states ratified the Amendment. For Texas, Virginia, Missis-
sippi, and Georgia, ratification was a prerequisite for readmission into the Union. The other six
Southern states that ratified the Amendment were North Carolina, West Virginia, Louisiana,
South Carolina, Arkansas, and Florida. Three of the six states that failed to ratify the Amend-
ment in the nineteenth century, Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee, never ratified it while the
other three, Delaware, Oregon and California, ratified the Amendment in 1901, 1959, and 1962
repectively. 9 JAMES D. RIcHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 4010-11 (1897); Statement of Hamilton Fish certifying the ratification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, No. 10, 16 Stat. ix-x (1870) (appendix); ALAN P. GRiMES, DEMOCRACY AND
Tm AMENDMENTS TO Tm CONSTnrUrION 58 (1978). For the legislative history of the Fifteenth
Amendment, see WILLIAM GII..EarE, TmE RIGTrr TO VOTE: PoLrIcs AND PASSAGE OF THE
FFrEENTH AMENDMENT (1965). For the evolution of Republicanism and the Republican poli-
cies regarding black suffrage between 1860 and 1870, see Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redef-
inition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
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Amendment. In Boston, about 3,000 blacks, including the veterans of
the 54th and 55th Massachusetts regiments, participated in the proces-
sion held in Boston Public Park.3 In Detroit, blacks carried portraits
of Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, and John Brown, and sang
verses which rang, "The ballot-box has come, now let us all prepare to
vote/With the party that made us free."'4 Prominent antislavery activ-
ists, Republican legislators, and black leaders spoke at the celebra-
tions, all proclaiming the final victory in the revolution against slavery.
To many antislavery veterans, the Fifteenth Amendment ushered
the American nation into a new historical epoch. Frederick Douglass
declared at a meeting in Albany in April 1870 that "color is no longer
to be a calamity;... race is to be no longer a crime; and ... liberty is
to be the right of all."' 5 Although not completely satisfied with the
final version of the Amendment, Wendell Phillips, a leading abolition-
ist and a radical Republican, shared Douglass's anticipation. Calling it
"the grandest and most Christian act ever contemplated or accom-
plished by any Nation,"' 6 Phillips believed that the Amendment ele-
vated African Americans from the status of "a lately enslaved and still
hated race to the full level of citizenship," 7 and that the Amendment
was thus "the completion and guaranty of emancipation itself."' 8 On
April 9, 1870, ten days after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified,
3. B.F. Roberts, Celebration of the Fifteenth Amendment in Boston, NEW ERA, Apr. 28,
1870, at 1.
4. The Celebration in Detroit, NEW ERA, Apr. 28, 1870, at 3.
5. Speech of Frederick Douglass at Tweddle Hall, Albany, April22, 1890, NEW ERA, May 5,
1870, at 2 [hereinafter Speech of Frederick Douglass]. At a celebration meeting in Baltimore,
Republican Judge Hugh Bond, Republican Representative Horace Maynard of Tennessee, and
Republican Senator Frederick A. Sawyer of South Carolina were invited to speak, together with
Frederick Douglass and John M. Langston, later the dean of the Department of Law of Howard
University. The Ratification Celebration in Baltimore, NEw ERA, May 12, 1870, at 2; The Fif-
teenth Amendment: The Grand Celebration in Baltimore on the 19th, NEW ERA, May 26, 1870, at
1. Meanwhile, celebrations were held in Raleigh, North Carolina; Pennsylvania; Knoxville, Ten-
nessee; and Virginia. The Richmond Celebration, NEW ERA, Apr. 28, 1870, at 2; Fifteenth
Amendment Celebration at Lincoln University, NEw ERA, May 5, 1870, at 1; Celebration in
Wilkesbarre, Pa, NEw ERA, May 5, 1870, at 2; The Fifteenth Amendment Celebration in Philadel-
phia, May 5, 1870, at 2. Frederick Douglass, Address in Albany, N.Y. (Apr. 22, 1870), reprinted
in 4 THE FREDERiCK DOUGLASS PAPERS 270-71 (John W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan
eds., 1979).
6. RECONSTRUCTION, THm NEGRO, AND THE NEw SOUTH 106 (La Wanda Cox & John H.
Cox eds., 1973).
7. Id. at 107.
8. Id. at 106. See also Wendell Phillips, The Constitutional Amendment, NAT'L ArNT-SLAv-
ERY STANDARD, Mar. 20, 1869, at 2. Phillips admitted that he was rather disappointed by the
Senate's decision to remove the right to take office from the final version of the Fifteenth
Amendment. He wished the senators who handled the Amendment were "a little more politi-
cians-and a little less reformers." Wendell Phillips, Congress, NAT'L AwNI-SLAVERY STAN-
DARD, Feb. 20, 1869, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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the American Anti-Slavery Society, of which Phillips was the presi-
dent, announced the end of its existence. 9
Many Republican leaders shared the popular feeling that the Fif-
teenth Amendment settled the issue of black men's voting rights and
signaled the end of the party's antislavery mission. President Grant
was convinced that, with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment,
the issue of black suffrage was "out of politics, and reconstruction
[was] completed."'10 In his special congratulatory message to the
members of Congress, Grant urged the legislative branch to "en-
courage popular education" of blacks to ensure the better use of their
new rights of suffrage." Other Republican leaders gave similar ad-
vice. Salmon P. Chase urged blacks to acquire faith, virtue, knowl-
edge, patience, temperance, and "brotherly kindness" to intelligently
exercise their political rights.12 Even black leaders like Frederick
Douglass believed that the Fifteenth Amendment had placed black
men "upon an equal footing with all other men" and that blacks had
to rely on their own efforts to achieve economic success and social
respect in the future.13
For some Republicans, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment meant the end of the nation's antislavery history. They saw no
need to continue to make race or previous condition of servitude an
issue in national politics, and they urged leniency for the former
rebels. In his reply to an invitation from black citizens in Cincinnati,
who were organizing a celebration of the Fifteenth Amendment, Chief
Justice Chase suggested that blacks urge Congress to remove the
political disability imposed on former rebels in the South by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Chase stated that by such actions blacks could
help establish peace, good will, and prosperity throughout the na-
9. The last meeting of the society was held at Apollo Hall, New York City. At that meet-
ing the members agreed to dissolve the society. The Disbandment of Forces, NEw ERA, Apr. 28,
1870, at 2. At the meeting, Frederick Douglass told his audience that the spirit of the society
would be carried on "through new instrumentalities" and devoted to the interests of the Indians,
women and "suffering humanity everywhere." Speech of Frederick Douglass, supra note 5, at 1;
4 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DouOLAss 45 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955). Wendell Phillips
believed that the influence of the Society would not die out and he said, "We sheathe no sword.
We only turn from the front rank of the army upon a new foe." American Anti-Slavery Society,
NAT'L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Apr. 16, 1870, at 1.
10. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Elihu B. Washburne (Jan. 28, 1870), reprinted in GEN-
ERAL GRANT's LETTERS TO A FRIEND, 1861-1880, at 64 (James W. Wilson ed., 1897).
11. 9 RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 4009-10.
12. Judge Chase, Letter from Him in Regard to the Fifteenth Amendment-He Advocates
Universal Amnesty, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1870, at 4 (quoting from Chase's letter to the black
citizens of the City of Cincinnati) [hereinafter Judge Chase].
13. New Era, May 5, 1870.
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tion. 14 A Boston Republican paper believed that "the amendment
would put an end to all the woes and leave the national energies free
to adjust the disturbed industries of the country, and to unite in minis-
tering to its highest prosperity and happiness.' 15
The gratitude blacks demonstrated toward the Republican party
seemed to assure the party of firm black support in the future. A
Republican newspaper predicted that the newly enfranchised blacks
would reinforce the party's strength in both the North and the South
during the upcoming congressional and state elections of 1870.16 Ad-
ding at least 850,000 black voters to the Republican camp would as-
sure the party of national preeminence for years to come. Harper's
Weekly, another staunch Republican organ, optimistically predicted
that in a year or so "the Union will be wholly restored, equal rights
secured, the debts greatly reduced, taxation diminished, and foreign
questions satisfactorily adjusted."'17
Despite all of the jubilation and optimism generated by the pas-
sage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, Republicans in
Congress remained rather cautious about the Amendment's actual ef-
fects. The loopholes in the Amendment were obvious to radical
Republicans. Theoretically, the Fifteenth Amendment imposed no re-
strictions on the states' power to regulate voting qualifications (other
than prohibiting exclusion on the basis of race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude). Nor did the Amendment clearly challenge the
ultimate authority of the states in regulating suffrage.18 Once Demo-
crats regained control of Southern states, some Republicans feared
that such states might enact legal restrictions on voting, such as prop-
14. Judge Chase, supra note 12, at 4.
15. Boston Advertiser, Jan. 25, Mar. 1, 1869, & Apr. 1, 1870, quoted in EDrH E. WARE,
POLITICAL OPINION IN MASSACHUSETTS DUPING CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 181 (1916).
16. Editorial Notes, N.Y. INDEPENDENT, Feb. 24, 1870, at 4.
17. The New Year, HARPER'S WKLY., Jan. 8, 1870, at 18. After he observed a local election
in Cincinnati, Rutherford B. Hayes wrote in his diary: "The colored people vote for the first time
under the Fifteenth Amendment. They are very happy and the people generally approve. They
vote Republican almost solid." 3 DIARY AND LETTERS OF RurHERFORD BiRCHARD HAYES 94
(Charles R. Williams ed., 1924).
18. In several decisions delivered between 1871 and 1886, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts affirmed that the Fifteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote on any
American citizens, but only restricted the federal and state governments from prohibiting citi-
zens from voting on the basis of race, color, and previous conditions of servitude. In 1874, the
Court held that the right to vote was not a privilege necessarily accompanying United States
citizenship and that the Fifteenth Amendment dealt with suffrage by protecting a citizen against
discrimination at the polls on account of race or color. But in 1883, in Ex Parte Yarbrough, the
Supreme Court stated that, given the political situation of the day, the Fifteenth Amendment did
aim at conferring on black men the right to vote. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). See also Minor v. Happer-
sett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873)
(No. 14,459).
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erty and literacy tests, which could prevent most black men from vot-
ing. Michigan Republican Jacob M. Howard voiced this concern in
the Senate debate over Virginia's readmission. Howard warned that if
the state of Virginia was allowed to impose a $200 property qualifica-
tion for voting, very few blacks in Virginia could vote and the Fif-
teenth Amendment would be "of very little value." 19
Republicans in Congress had good reason to worry about
whether the political equality promised by the Fifteenth Amendment
would be realized. Southern politics in 1870 were characterized not
by the peace, good feeling, and prosperity that northerners had ex-
pected to see, but by the violence, brutality, and disorder caused by
Ku Klux Klan activities. The Ku Klux Klan, founded in early 1866 and
composed mainly of extreme white supremacists and former rebels,
spread throughout the South in late 1869 and 1870. Under the pretext
of restoring social order, but in reality to destroy Republican-con-
trolled state governments, Klansmen used force and terror to attack
black voters who voted or would vote for Republican tickets. By
1870, the Ku Klux Klan and other similar organizations like the
Knights of the White Camelia and the White Brotherhood, in Eric
Foner's words, "had become deeply entrenched in nearly every South-
ern state." Serving as "a military force" for the Democratic party in
the South, the Klan's terror was aimed at both overthrowing the Re-
publican state governments and privately persecuting Republican
leaders and supporters, black and white. Under the Klan's terror, the
number of black voters was reduced, Democrats won control of state
legislatures, and black Republican leaders were whipped and mur-
dered in their homes.20
Meanwhile, state and local Republicans were restrained by state
constitutions from enacting powerful and effective policies to combat
the Klan's activities. According to historian Allen W. Trelease, be-
tween 1869 and 1870 the Klan's terror quickly developed in almost
every Southern state except South Carolina, where the Klan peaked in
1868. Although the Republican government of Arkansas passed anti-
Klan laws, those laws were "unfeasible politically, and seldom were
their sections enforced." One reason for the ineffectiveness of these
laws was that the state constitution denied the governor the authority
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. In March 1870, this situation
19. CONo. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 600 (1870).
20. Etic FoNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
425-30 (1988).
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forced North Carolina Governor William W. Holden to appeal to
President Grant and Congress for federal legislation on Klan activities
and ask to have Klansman punished by military tribunal. Meanwhile,
no fair trial could be carried out because of the interference of Klan
sympathizers. 21
The intensity of the Klan's activities forced black legislators in
Georgia to present a petition to Hiram R. Revels of Mississippi, the
nation's first black senator, in which they declared,
If elections take place this fall . . . [v]iolence and bloodshed will
mark the course of such elections, and a fair expression of the will
of the people cannot be had. We shall be driven from the polls, as
in the Presidential election by armed and organized bands of rebels,
and our State given over to the guidance and control of the most
extreme men of the Democratic party.22
This petition revealed not only the urgent need to check the Ku
Klux Klan's terror, but also the foreseeable collapse of the Republican
governments in the South if the federal government failed to take seri-
ous and prompt action to protect black voters. On March 16, 1870,
when the Senate discussed the Georgia readmission bill, Revels rose
"to plead for protection for the defenseless race" in the South and
urged the Republican party and Congress to enforce the recent consti-
tutional amendments. 23 Other Republican senators from the South
warned their colleagues that "every mail brings to us the details of
some revolting tragedy" and that "[n]othing but the most stringent of
all laws and regulations will check this era of bloodshed and dethrone
this dynasty of the knife and bullet. '24 The Southern Republican sen-
ators declared that "the Republican party must stand in carrying into
effect the reconstruction policy, or the whole fabric of reconstruction,
with all principles connected with it, amounts to nothing at all."'25
The Klan terrorism certainly alarmed the Republicans and moti-
vated them to make the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment an
21. ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTH-
ERN RECONSTRUCTION 191-273 (1971); FONER, supra note 20, at 342-44, 425-30.
22. EDMUND L. DRAGO, BLACK POLITICIANS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: A
SPLENDID FAILURE 58 (1982) (quoting ATLANTA CONST. Mar. 16, 1870).
23. Revels forcefully argued that black soldiers rushed to rescue Union armies "thinned by
death and disaster," and the people in the North "owe to the colored race a deep obligation
which it is no easy matter to fulfill." Obviously, Revels was responding to the petition sent to
him by the Georgia black legislators, although there is no evidence that he read the petition
before the Senate. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1987 (1870) (statement of Senator
Revels).
24. Id. at 3669 (statement of George E. Spencer).
25. Id. at 3613 (statement of John Pool of North Carolina).
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"absolute necessity. '26 The second section of the Amendment, which
empowered Congress to enforce the first section by "appropriate leg-
islation," 27 established a constitutional basis for enforcement. In ef-
fect, many Republicans believed that the Fifteenth Amendment
would remain ineffective until and unless it was enforced by additional
federal laws. In other words, if no further federal laws were enacted,
racial discrimination in voting would be constitutionally feasible. This
belief was largely derived from the expectation that states would not
observe the Amendment faithfully. Senator John Sherman, usually a
moderate Republican, argued that "some law should be passed by
Congress' 28 to implement the first section of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, for without additional laws the Fifteenth Amendment
would not have the full force and sanction of law. At least there is
such a doubt about it that it is our imperative duty before we leave
here to pass suitable laws to enforce the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment
in every State of the Union. Otherwise, Democratic judges.., who
enforce the election laws in the different States, will cover them-
selves under this construction of the Constitution, and the
[F]ifteenth [A]mendment will be practically disregarded in every
community where there is a strong prejudice against negro voting.29
Sherman's argument represented a practical concern that the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment had to be interpreted and de-
fined by further enforcement laws. Given the political tensions be-
tween the Democratic-buttressed Klan activities and the recently
established Southern Republicanism, Republicans saw enforcement as
an opportunity to develop and consolidate the party's influence
among Southern voters, especially black voters. Republicans also
hoped to make black voters a long-term, loyal, Republican voting
population so that the party could meet the expected challenges of the
Democratic party. But the Republicans were not motivated solely by
partisan interests. In fact, during much of the Reconstruction period,
many Republicans frequently identified the party's political interests
with the interests of the nation. Whether the Republican party could
shield black men's right to vote was a test of the strength of the na-
tional authority, as well as that of the endurance of the party's Recon-
struction program.
26. Id. at 3568 (statement of Senator Sherman).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana later reinforced Sherman by arguing that
"[the] second section is intended to give to Congress the power of conferring upon the colored
man the full enjoyment of his right .... [W]e take both of these sections together, we construe
them in harmony with each other." Id. at 3670.
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By early 1870, many radical Republicans identified the party's
programs and interests with national interests, particularly on the is-
sue of black suffrage. For them, the Fifteenth Amendment was the
greatest achievement of the Civil War, and its constitutionality had to
be maintained. The Ku Klux Klan and Democratic denial of black
suffrage was a denial of the authority of the Fifteenth Amendment, as
well as of the whole principle of civil and political equality underlying
Reconstruction as led by the radical wing of the Republican party.
Thus, for the radicals, enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment was not
merely a partisan issue, but a matter of national concern. The en-
forcement was designed to demonstrate the national government's
power to protect the political rights of its citizens. The political impli-
cation of enforcement, as Carl Schurz, a leading Republican in the
Senate, put it, was to use national power to impose a change upon the
"[plopular prejudice, so long nourished ... [and] naturally arrayed
against the enfranchisement of the former slave."'30 Thus, Jacob How-
ard said that enforcing black suffrage in the South would prevent "a
repetition" of the Civil War crisis and maintain "the authority of the
Union. 31 In a sense, enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment was indeed
a struggle for the success of the party, but more importantly, it was an
effort to fulfill the political promises of the nation's recent revolution
which the party had led.
II. Ti FIRST ENFORCEMENT ACT
Throughout the period in which the enforcement laws were de-
bated, the Republican party maintained a dominant majority in Con-
gress. At the Second Session of the Forty-First Congress, when the
first and second Enforcement Acts were debated and passed, there
were 61 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 2 Conservatives in the Sen-
ate, while in the House there were 164 Republicans and 67 Demo-
crats.32 Given this political advantage, it seemed that the party would
have little difficulty passing an Enforcement Act. But from the intro-
duction of the first enforcement bill at the second session of the Forty-
First Congress in February 1870 to the passage of the last enforcement
act at the second session of the Forty-Second Congress in June 1872,
30. Id. at 3608.
31. Id. at 3610-11. As early as the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, William Stewart
had reminded the Democrats of the congressional power to "go into all the States and secure to
all men the equal protection of the laws in their civil rights" and to "wipe out all distinctions and
discriminations on account of race or color in their political rights." Id. at 1329.
32. Id. at v-xi.
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tensions and disagreements occurred among Republicans in both
Houses. The Republicans heatedly debated several issues: How far
and how extensive should the enforcement be carried out; whose vot-
ing rights should be protected under the Fifteenth Amendment; how
much power should the federal enforcement officers be given to en-
force the Amendment; should the President be authorized to use mili-
tary force in their behalf; and should individual citizens be punished
for violating the Fifteenth Amendment. On the surface, these debates
suggested that Republicans differed on policy making. But under-
neath, these debates reflected a growing divergence of the Republi-
cans' political outlook that would eventually split the party. The
differences also exposed intra-party divisions over political equality
between white and black Americans, as well as indicated a change in
how the party defined its role in protecting black rights.
The first clash among the Republicans regarding enforcement oc-
curred when the first enforcement bill was discussed in both Houses in
May 1870. The House enforcement bill was introduced on February
21, 1870, but was not called for discussion until May 16, 1870. The
essential object of the House bill, according to John Bingham who
introduced it, was to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment nationwide.
Bingham noted that black suffrage had been denied not only in the
South, but also in such Northern states as Ohio, his home state.33 The
House bill confirmed the principle underlying the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, that racial discrimination against black voters should be re-
moved in all states. It penalized by fine and imprisonment any action
by federal and state officers that obstructed citizens from registering
and voting. It punished any individual who prevented black citizens
from exercising the suffrage by force and violence. Finally, the bill
authorized the judges of federal circuit courts to hear all cases con-
cerning its enforcement.34
Although brief, the House bill was unambiguous in direction and
harsh in punishment. Much of it was focused on regulating the behav-
ior of federal and state enforcement officers. Clearly, the primary
33. Id. at 1459, 3503.
34. The House bill (H.R. No. 1293) had ten sections. Its first section extended federal en-
forcement of the Fifteenth Amendment "at any Federal, State, county, municipal, or other elec-
tion." Violations would be punished by a fine between $500 and $5,000 or imprisonment
between one and three years. Sections 2 and 9 provided punishment for any individual who
prevented black voters from voting by force and violence. Sections 3 to 8 penalized state and
federal officers who refused to register black voters, who prevented black voters from casting
their votes, or who refused to receive taxes from black voters if the taxes were prerequisites for
voting or registration. Section 10 gave federal district courts the power to hear cases arising
under the law. Id. at 3503-04.
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goal of the House bill was to punish violations committed by federal
and state officials who were designated to handle and supervise elec-
tions. The bill also included two notable features: the enforcement of
black suffrage at all elections, federal, state, or municipal; and the im-
position of punishment upon individual citizens who prevented black
voters from voting. But the bill provided no enforcement machinery
other than to designate federal circuit and district judges to hear cases
arising under the bill.35 No other legal or military apparatus was con-
sidered. The House bill was more declaratory than punitive.
Compared with the House bill, the Senate measure was lengthy
and comprehensive.36 The Senate bill differed radically from the
House bill in four respects.37 First, the Senate bill established the
principle that the act of fulfilling one's voting prerequisites was
equivalent to the act of exercising one's right to vote, so that any at-
tempt or action by federal and state officials to prevent a black voter
from meeting voting prerequisites was equivalent to infringing his
right to vote. In other words, while the House bill defined illegal prac-
tices only as the refusal of federal or state election officials to receive
taxes and to assess property for black voters, the Senate bill made it
illegal to block black voters from registering and voting. Second, the
Senate bill made it a federal crime for individuals to conspire against a
citizen's enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution and federal
laws, including the right to vote. While the House bill only lightly
punished individual violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Sen-
35. Id.
36. The Senate bill grew out of several similar bills introduced by William Stewart, Oliver P.
Morton, Charles Sumner, and George F. Edmunds between February and April. Although
based upon Edmunds's proposal, the final version of the bill was heavily reworked by the Judici-
ary Committee, which included Stewart, the author of the Fifteenth Amendment. Senate
Republicans started to introduce enforcement bills even before the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified. Sumner's bill (S. 598) was introduced on February 28, 1870, two weeks after Morton
introduced his first bill (S. 538) to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. On April 1, 1870, Morton
introduced another bill (S. 744) to substitute for his first bill. All these Senate bills, including
Stewart's own bill (S. 503), were put aside when the Senate Judiciary Committee decided to
bring before the Senate a new bill (S. 810, originally proposed by George F. Edmunds of Ver-
mont on April 19, 1870) for discussion. Id. at 1584, 2808, 2942.
37. The original version of the Senate bill had 17 sections. Sections 1 to 5 prohibited federal
and state officials or any individual from preventing black voters from exercising their right to
vote, to register, and to fulfill the prerequisites of voting. Violations would be punished by fine
or imprisonment or both. Section 6 authorized federal courts to hear cases under this law. Sec-
tions 8 to 10 empowered federal district courts to appoint election commissioners (which were
later called "supervisors"), described the duties of the commissioners, and provided fees for the
arrests they would make at the polls. Sections 11 and 12 authorized the President to direct the
enforcement and to use military force, when necessary, to aid the enforcement. Section 13 and
14 asked to remove those barred by the third section of the Fourteenth Amendment from hold-
ing office and continued to bar them from holding offices. Sections 15 to 17 enforced the rights
proscribed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 3559-62.
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ate bill penalized individuals who conspired to deprive black voters of
any of their civil and political rights. This was particularly important
since the Ku Klux Klan carried out much of black disfranchisement in
the South. Third, the Senate bill provided for a substantial enforce-
ment machinery. While the House bill only authorized federal courts
to hear cases, the Senate bill empowered judges to appoint supervisors
to watch the process of voting and registration, to make arrests, and to
appoint deputies, who were also authorized to make arrests at polls.
The bill also gave the President the power to use federal military force
"for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and trial of persons
charged with a violation of this act."'38 Fourth, the Senate bill en-
forced not only the Fifteenth Amendment, but also the third section
of the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to disqualify former
rebels from holding office and by removing those who already held
office. To prevent Klan actions against blacks outside the polling
places, the bill enforced some provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was absent from the House bill.39
Obviously, Senate Republicans were far more perceptive than
their House counterparts in detecting the problems in the South.
They saw the real obstacle to black suffrage not in the election laws of
Southern states, but in the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan. They real-
ized that many infringements of black suffrage occurred not at the
polls, but on plantations and highways, or other places with an "imme-
diate relation to registration and to voting."4 Furthermore, they be-
lieved that more voting prerequisites would be "invented" to
disfranchise black voters once Democrats took over Southern state
governments. Finally, they saw that the Republican state govern-
ments in the South alone could not stop the Klan terror or the rapid
development of black disfranchisement by force, and that the federal
government was obliged to intervene.41 Thus, the Senate intended to
create an enforcement bill that would provide black voters with more
complete protection, and that would be executed by an adequate fed-
eral enforcement machinery. The framers clearly expected the bill to
38. Id. at 3561.
39. Id. at 3559-61.
40. Id. at 3559.
41. In his criticism of the House bill, Senator Stewart labelled it as "good for nothing." He
pointed out that the House bill provided nothing to protect black voters if they were driven out
of the polls or prevented from registration by a mob. He agreed with Senator John Pool of
North Carolina that conspiracies against black voters could occur on plantations rather than at
polling places. Id.
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be a cure-all to stop the rampant Ku Klux Klan, to protect the civil
and political rights of African Americans, and to defeat Democratic
attempts to regain political power in the South.
Both Houses started to debate their own enforcement bills in
mid-May. After a brief debate, the House passed its bill with over-
whelming partisan support on May 16.42 When the House bill reached
the Senate on the same day, the upper house was virtually in a stale-
mate. Moderate Republicans immediately asked to substitute the
House bill for the Senate version in order to further the discussion of
enforcement. Having seen that it was impossible to neglect the House
bill, William Stewart, the Republican floor manager of the enforce-
ment issue, agreed to have the House bill brought up for discussion.
But as soon as the House bill was presented, Stewart asked to amend
it by striking its original contents and inserting instead the whole Sen-
ate bill, under the title of the House bill. By this tactic, the House bill
virtually became the Senate bill.43
The initial debates in the Senate focused on which enforcement
bill should be passed. Although opposed to both, Democrats particu-
larly loathed the Senate bill. George Vickers of Maryland argued that
"[t]he contingency or occasion for the passage of this act has not
arisen .... [T]he extension of suffrage to the African race was not
intended to enlarge the power of Congress over the white race....
The term 'appropriate legislation' confers no new power on Con-
gress." 4" Vickers obviously saw the Republicans' purpose of using the
national power to change the political habit of the South and cried
that "the ballot cannot elevate the colored man and make him equal
to the white.... Providence has wisely made and separated the races
by a law which no Government can annul.... The laws of nature, of
the races, have in those respects created an inseparable barrier which
neither legislation nor bayonets can demolish." 45 Allen Thurman of
Ohio called the Senate bill "inofficious and nugatory." Thurman was
the only Democrat who criticized the bill on legal grounds. He argued
that to put the trial of election perjury in the hands of federal courts
was "to take away from the State courts the right to punish offenses"
because election perjury was also an offense under many state laws.
42. The vote was almost strictly by party, with 131 yeas (all Republicans), 43 nays (42 Dem-
ocrats and 1 Republican) and 53 not voting (34 Republicans, 18 Democrats, and 1 Conservative).
Id. at 3504.
43. When the Senate could not agree on its own bill, John Sherman suggested that the
House bill be considered as a substitute. Id. at 3518.
44. Id. at 3481.
45. Id. at 3484.
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He also criticized the congressional authorization that the President
could use military power to keep order at polls as putting "the civil
under the military authority in its most vital point. '46
But the Republicans were also divided. A major criticism from
the Republican camp was that the Senate bill was too harsh on former
rebels and too broad in its scope. Orris S. Ferry, a conservative Re-
publican from Connecticut, asked to remove sections 13 and 14 from
the Senate bill concerning the political disability of Southern whites.
Ferry argued that disqualifying them from suffrage and political of-
fices was "in defiance of the principles upon which our party rests...
[and would injury] the whole society. ' 47 His argument for restoring
the political rights of the former rebels was that since the amendments
established national citizenship and national political rights, the for-
mer rebels should be encouraged to "get out of this sectional isolation
and come up to the grandeur of American nationality." 48 Ferry's real
concern, however, was that the party should develop a conciliatory
policy toward Southern whites, "the class out of whom we have got to
win adherents to the Republican party, or the Republican party will
go down in every southern State.149 He deeply distrusted black vot-
ers, who, in his view, would "retain the old attachment to the old
home and the old master, and those attachments will stay with them
till they die."'50
Ferry's remarks won support from a group of Republicans from
the South, including Hiram R. Revels of Mississippi, the first black to
serve in the Senate. Revels also urged political leniency for Southern
whites.51 Frederick A. Sawyer of South Carolina praised Ferry for
echoing "the sentiments of the vast majority of the people of the Re-
46. Id. at 3487, 3488.
47. Id. at 3490.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 3511.
50. Id.
51. This was the only speech Revels made in the whole debate over the enforcement act.
Revels's term in the Senate was very brief (February 25, 1870, to March 3, 1871) and he was
placed on an insignificant committee on education and labor. During his term, Revels intro-
duced three bills on Mississippi's economy and mixed education in Washington, D.C., none of
which became law. Revels also introduced eighteen petitions, many of which asked for removal
of political disabilities for white Mississippians. As for enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment,
Revels seemed to respond coldly to the radical Senate bill, although in his first speech on March
16, 1870, on the Georgia readmission bill, he strongly demanded federal protection to support
the state government. Revels was the only black representative in the entire Congress when the
first and second enforcement acts were debated, but he was absent from final voting of both acts.
Id. at 1986-88, 3520 (statements of Hiram R. Revels); see also SAMUEL D. SMrrH, THE NEGRO iN
CONGRESS, 1870-1901, at 20 (1940); MAURRNE CHmis'roPma, BLACK AMERcANs IN CONGRESS
9 (1976).
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publican party," and argued that continuing the political disability of
Southern whites would "cut off from the Republican party one of its
great elements of strength. ' 52 Conservative concerns about whether
former rebels could hold office reflected their belief that the future of
the Southern Republicanism depended on white instead of black vot-
ers, a belief that would gain widespread acceptance in the party in the
late 1870s and the 1880s.
Radical Republicans were upset with the moderates and conserv-
atives for advocating a "policy of conciliation. '53 They quickly saw
the danger in returning former rebels to political offices. Oliver P.
Morton argued that without black suffrage firmly established in the
South, allowing politically disabled whites to hold office would dis-
mantle black suffrage and make the Fourteenth Amendment "a per-
fect nullity." Morton warned his colleagues that if Jefferson Davis
were allowed to return to the Senate, the black Senator Hiram Revels
would be driven out of the Senate. Thus, the policy of conciliation,
cried Morton, was "a mistaken policy that has failed from the very
first." The former rebels, Morton stated, "have been cast in the mold
of the rebellion, and in that mold they will remain. ' 54 Simon Cam-
eron agreed, endorsing a measure that would require the enforcement
of black suffrage prior to the removal of white disabilities. The Penn-
sylvania Republican argued that "the rebels of the war were rebels
still." 55
While most Republicans did not want to restore the rights of the
former rebels to hold office, they were hesitant to commit to an exten-
sive federal law. They feared that protecting black political rights to
such a comprehensive degree might supersede the states' right to reg-
ulate elections. For many Republicans, the regulation of suffrage had
been and remained a state matter, over which the federal government
had no authority except for the color qualification. In their view, en-
forcement of black suffrage should never go beyond a narrow inter-
52. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3517-18 (1870).
53. The use of "radical" or "moderate" is confined to defining Republicans' stances on
enforcement. In other words, these terms are used as working terminology. People switched
their positions on the issue from time to time, even during the discussion of the same bill, as
Oliver P. Morton, John Pool, and Carl Schurz did. "Radical Republicans" refers to those
Republicans who tended to support a harsher policy toward the South and more comprehensive
federal protection for black voters. "Moderates" or "conservatives" refers to those who tended
to leave the question to the states, with a minimum of federal interference.
54. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3489 (1870).
55. Id. at 3519.
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pretation of the Fifteenth Amendment.5 6 John Sherman, who
approved the enforcement but opposed a harsh bill, argued that the
second and third sections of the Senate bill were "too vague and in-
definite to found an indictment upon." According to Sherman, the
Fifteenth Amendment should be interpreted strictly, but not to the
extent that all other state registration laws would be overruled to pro-
tect black voters.5 7 Oliver P. Morton, who had earlier opposed the
moderate "policy of conciliation" because it restored former rebels
back to political office,58 criticized the Senate bill as "too general in its
character ... without reference to the Fifteenth Amendment." John
Pool, a Republican from North Carolina, also criticized the Senate bill
as too broad and inapplicable to individuals.59 These Republicans
shared some of the Democrats' views on state regulation of suffrage
and doubted federal authority to punish individual violators of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Where the line between state
and federal authority over these issues remained undefined, these
Republicans chose a milder and more restrained enforcement policy. 60
For the radicals, the states' rights theories were "fallacies," and
were no more than an excuse to deny the federal government the au-
thority to protect the political and civil rights of American citizens. To
those who fought the Slave Power before the war, the term "state
rights" was still an irritating reminder of the cause of the late war.
Attacking the call for respecting states' rights, Carl Schurz argued that
black liberties and civil rights had been subject to the mercy of the
states, rescued by the Republican-led revolution, and placed "under
the shield of national protection."' 61 In his view, the late war and Re-
construction had transformed the constitutional culture of American
56. Morton argued that suffrage was still "completely under the control of the several States
... except we have taken away their power to deny suffrage on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude." Id. at 3569-70.
57. Id. at 3570.
58. Id. at 3489.
59. Both Morton and Pool had no consistent position in the debates. In later discussion,
Morton contributed a section to the final version of the bill (the fifth section) to punish anyone
who wanted to prevent blacks from voting by economic threats. Pool contributed to the sixth
section of the final bill, which punished individual conspiracies against black voters outside pol-
ling places. Id. at 3569-70, 3611-12.
60. The Democrats regarded the Senate bill as particularly dangerous, because it severely
punished "not officers of a State at all, mere private individuals, [but] mere trespassers, mere
breakers of the peace, mere violators of the State law." Id. Democratic Senator John P. Stock-
ton of New Jersey, a leading opponent of both bills, stated that "the Fifteenth Amendment will
enforce itself.... [I]t would be wise not to pass any bill." He charged the Senate bill with
creating "a great many new offenses." l at 3568. Allen G. Thurman of Ohio called the Senate
bill "wholly unnecessary and nugatory." Id. at 3485.
61. Id. at 3608.
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society, which "secures to the generality of its members ...to the
whole people, and not to a part of them only, the right and the means
to cooperate in the management of their common affairs, either di-
rectly, or, where direct action is impossible, by a voluntary delegation
of power." Thus, to guarantee the enjoyment of national rights, the
national government was obliged to provide adequate protection for
its citizens. 62
Undoubtedly, radical Republicans looked to black suffrage as a
major support for the development of Republicanism in the South,
but their motivations for enacting a strong enforcement bill were
more complicated than simply gaining political advantage. They be-
lieved that black suffrage in Southern states was "for half a century,
perhaps a century, to be the safeguard by which the authority of the
Union [was] to be maintained and upheld in those States. '63
The radicals broadly interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment. They
saw that black suffrage could be disrupted by various state and indi-
vidual actions discriminating on the account of race or color and that,
if such a violation occurred, the federal government had to punish it.
Radical Republicans refused to see voting rights as isolated from the
rest of the political and social context. Rather, the right to vote was
an integral part of federal citizenship and closely associated with the
exercise of civil rights. Senator William Stewart of Nevada stated that
the enforcement policy had to meet a hundred prerequisites that were
invented by the States and had to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from
going upon plantations and intimidating people.64 The use of "general
language" in the Senate bill and the inclusion of the power to enforce
civil rights prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Stewart reasoned, were to cover any "act neces-
sary to give a voter the right to vote."65 The differences between the
House and Senate bills was that the House bill was "simply to follow
on after the violation of law and punish the man who has violated it, in
each particular case, by fine and imprisonment" while the Senate bill
was "to carry out and enforce the principle of this amendment of the
Constitution and give effect to the votes of colored persons offered at
the polls." 66
62. Id. at 3608-09.
63. Id. at 3613 (statement of Jacob Howard).
64. Id. at 3658.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3563 (statement of Matthew H. Carpeter of Wisconsin).
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Concerns about the reactionary nature of states' rights theory,
the need to consolidate national authority over citizens' political and
civil rights, and the broad interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment
supplied the rationale for the Senate bill. There was, however, a prob-
lem of time. The radicals wanted to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in separate bills, but they feared
that there was "no time to take it up as a separate measure, discuss it,
and pass it at this session. '67
As a result, the Senate debates provided a kaleidoscope of
amendments and changing positions. The Senate bill actually grew
instead of being reduced or restricted. John Pool of North Carolina
suggested that private individuals could be punished if they violated
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although those amend-
ments prohibited only state violations, he said, "If a State by omission
neglects to give to every citizen within its borders a free, fair, and full
exercise and enjoyment of his rights, it is the duty of the United States
Government to go into the State." Pool's interpretation became the
underpinning of the bill's sixth section, which punished individual vio-
lations. 6s Realizing that most Southern blacks still depended upon the
white economy, Morton, earlier a Republican critic of the Senate bill,
asked to insert punishments against individuals who prevented blacks
from voting by using economic threats, such as unemployment, ejec-
tion from rented houses, lands and other property, or refusing to re-
new leases or contracts for labor. These threats, Morton believed,
were the most effective means for former masters to control the freed-
men's votes and were "the great[est] ... danger to which the colored
population of the South [are] exposed .... ." The Senate immediately
accepted Morton's amendment and it became the fifth section of the
final bill.69
During the debate, problems at the Northern polls were also dis-
cussed when John Sherman asked to add three sections dealing with
fraudulent voting practices in Northern cities. Referring to the Re-
publican loss in New York City in 1868, Sherman called the election
fraud "a grievance which has become of greater magnitude even than
denial of right to vote to colored people ... ,,70 Because of the fraud
committed in Northern cities like New York, where the Democrats
controlled every congressional district, the purity of the nation's entire
67. Id at 3559.
68. Id. at 3613.
69. Id at 3678.
70. Id at 3663.
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election system was destroyed. According to Sherman, Northern elec-
tion fraud had become "a national evil so great, so dangerous, and so
alarming in character" that Congress had to adopt some provisions
"to protect itself and the people from the danger arising from these
great frauds." 71 Sherman proposed to add three sections to the Sen-
ate bill to punish fraud in voting and registration.72 Democrats imme-
diately opposed Sherman's amendments, calling them inappropriate
and partisan. But Republicans stood firm, and Sherman's proposals
were eventually written into the enforcement law.73 The Sherman
sections on election fraud actually opened a new vista for the enforce-
ment, which would become a major issue two months later when a
naturalization bill was brought into discussion.
After a tiring debate of nineteen hours on May 20, the Senate
passed the bill.74 When the bill returned to the House for concur-
rence, the House immediately asked for a joint conference to discuss
the differences. But the bill remained substantially unchanged and
was once again approved by the Senate on May 25.75 Democrats in
the House tried to filibuster against the measure, which they called "a
fatal blow at the State rights." But owing to the Republican majority,
the House succeeded in passing the conference report of the bill.76
On May 31, 1870, the bill went into effect with President Grant's
approval.
The first Enforcement Act, altogether 23 sections, enforced sev-
eral clusters of Reconstruction laws, including the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but the focus
was on black suffrage. The bill restated the first section of the Fif-
teenth Amendment in a positive tone, asserting that all U.S. citizens'
71. Id. at 3664.
72. Sherman's three sections eventually became sections 21, 22, and 23. Id.
73. Id. at 3664-65 (statement of Eugene Casserly); id. at 3672 (statement of Charles
Sumner).
74. A majority of Republicans finally agreed with the Senate amendments to the House bill.
The voting result was 43 yeas (all Republicans), 8 nays (6 Democrats and 1 Union Republican
[Joseph S. Fowler]), and 21 absents (4 Democrats and 17 Republicans). Id. at 3690.
75. In his report to the Senate, Stewart, who headed the senatorial representation of the
join conference, said that the report did "not change any of the essential features of the bill as it
passed the Senate, but [only made] it a little more harmonious .... " d at 3754. The vote was
overwhelmingly partisan, with 48 yeas (all Republicans), 11 nays (10 Democrats and 1 Union
Republican) and 13 absents (1 Conservative and 10 Republicans, including Hiram R. Revels,
Carl Schurz and Henry Wilson). Id. at 3809.
76. For details of the House Democrats' remarks on the bill, see speeches made by Michael
C. Kerr of Indiana, James B. Beck of Kentucky, Clarkson N. Potter of New York, James A.
Johnson of California, and John D. Stiles of Pennsylvania. The final vote in the House was 133
yeas (all Republicans), 58 nays (55 Democrats, 2 Conservatives and 1 Republican), and 39 not
voting (31 Republicans, 7 Democrats and 1 Conservative). Id. at 3872-81, 3884.
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right to vote "at any elections by the people" should not be deprived
on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The bill
ordered election officers to give equal opportunity for all voters to
meet any prerequisites required by the states for voting without racial
discrimination (sections 2 and 3); punished those who obstructed qual-
ified voters from voting and registering by force, bribery, threats, and
intimidation (section 4); imposed a severe fine and imprisonment
upon those who prevented voters from exercising suffrage by threat-
ening to terminate existing financial arrangements with the voters,
such as employment, contracts and tenancy (section 5); and penalized
two or more individuals who, by conspiracy or in disguise, intimidated
or injured a citizen with intent to prevent his "free exercise and enjoy-
ment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States" (section 6). 77 The bill also
provided a mechanism for enforcement, including authority for fed-
eral district courts to hear enforcement cases, federal district attorneys
and marshals to investigate violations of the Fifteenth Amendment
and make arrests, and the president to use military force to keep order
at the polls if needed (sections 7-13, 19, 23). The second object of the
act was to ban fraudulent practices in elections (sections 20-22).
Third, the act continued to bar former rebels from holding political
office, essentially a provision contained in the third section of the
Fourteenth Amendment (sections 14-15). Finally, the bill provided
that all persons, including immigrants, should be given equal civil
rights, such as the right to make contracts and to sue, and others se-
cured by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (sections 16-18).78 Well aware
77. Emphasis is added by this author. The act did not specify what was "any right or privi-
lege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." But given the
context of the debates, it clearly meant the rights secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The right to vote was certainly included in "any
right or privilege." This section was strongly opposed by the Democrats and moderate Republi-
cans and would be challenged by the Supreme Court in its 1876 United States v. Cruikshank
decision. But no action was taken by the Court regarding this section, which was adopted in the
Revised Statutes in 1875 and 1878, and has remained in federal statutory books until today. For a
more detailed discussion of this issue, see Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and Northern Republicans,
1865-1891, ch. 3 & 5 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University); see also
Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism" Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. OYr.
REv. 39-79.
78. Section 16 provided that same right should be applied to all persons in the United
States, citizen or alien, who should enjoy "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens" and should be subject to
equal punishment and taxation. No unequal taxation should be imposed by any state upon for-
eign immigrants. Section 17 provided that no unequal punishment should be imposed upon a
foreigner because of his color or race. Section 18 declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
would be enforced by this enforcement bill. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. 651-53
(1870).
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of the diversity of the objectives of the bill, the framers of the bill
finally entitled it "An Act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and
for other purposes. '79
The enforcement bill, known as the Enforcement Act of May 31,
1870, was the first and most important congressional legislation to en-
force the Fifteenth Amendment. All other Enforcement Acts passed
thereafter were either a derivation or extension of this act, or aimed at
other subjects with the suffrage enforcement included as a rider.8 0
The act concretely defined the extent to which voting rights would be
exercised and protected under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. It gave substance to the Fifteenth Amendment and identified
the connection between civil and political rights. While the Enforce-
ment Act provided punishment for individual actions against black
suffrage, it did so in the historical context that much of the Southern
terrorism was committed by conspiracies of allied individuals (Klan
members) unpunished by state laws. The act was also significant be-
cause it was the first to extend federal enforcement in the North,
which signaled the party's effort to establish a national system of elec-
tion supervision.
But the act caused fear, even among those who pushed it through
Congress. Carl Schurz, a staunch supporter of the act, warned his col-
leagues that federal enforcement of black rights should not be used
"as soon as the pressure of necessity ceases." If the Republican party
attempted "to carry that revolution much farther in the direction of an
undue centralization of power[, it] would run against a popular in-
stinct far stronger than party allegiance has ever proved to be."' 81 Not
long thereafter, Schurz became a leading spokesman for the liberal
Republicans, who would constantly attack the enforcement policy.
Republican disagreements on the Senate and House bills were
closely observed by the New York Times, which believed that they
indicated "the sentiment of the Senate on the question of general am-
nesty and the policy of the Republican party toward the People of
South."82 Later the paper asserted that the fight over enforcement
79. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
80. The second Force Act (July 14,1870) was aimed at standardizing the process of naturali-
zation. The third (February 28, 1871) reinforced the first Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. The
fourth, known as the Ku Klux Force Act (April 20, 1871), focused on punishing Klanism
although it enforced black rights to vote. The fifth, contained in an appropriation bill of 1872,
had a few sections dealing with judicial enforcement in elections. These acts will be discussed in
detail in the latter parts of this paper.
81. CoNr. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3609 (1870).
82. The Fifteenth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1870, at 1.
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showed that the Republicans were split into two factions, "the one
seeking to inaugurate new and harsh measures toward the South, and
the other to secure pacification and to construct some wise and pru-
dent policy independently of old issues of the war. ' 83 The Times had
detected the party's problem, and the problem would not go away.
III. TiE NATURALIZATION ACT
Although the primary object of the Enforcement Act of May 31,
1870, was to protect Southern black voters from Klan terrorism, sev-
eral sections of the act also dealt with fraudulent election practices
occurring in the North. True, the Fifteenth Amendment neither ad-
dressed the issue of election fraud nor specifically authorized Con-
gress to provide appropriate legislation to correct the fraud. But the
reality that Northern fraud could hurt the party as much as Southern
black disfranchisement, and eventually hurt the whole system of con-
gressional elections, alarmed the Republicans. For such Republicans
as John Bingham in the House and John Sherman in the Senate, re-
moving election fraud in the North was as important as protecting
black suffrage in the South. During the debate over the first Enforce-
ment Act, they reminded their colleagues that the fraudulent election
practices found in Northern cities could come back to haunt the
party.84 While the Republican party might protect Southern black
voters with the first Enforcement Act, the measure was defeated in
the North by the Democratic party, which became increasingly effec-
tive in regaining influence over Northern voters. The Republican
party's loss in New York during the 1868 presidential election was still
a fresh memory. Not only did New York fail to give its electoral votes
to Grant and Colfax, but the Democratic party also won thirteen of
the state's thirty-one seats in Congress.85
One serious fraudulent practice in Northern cities, particularly in
New York City, was that recent immigrants cast votes by using false
naturalization papers to certify citizenship. Although national citizen-
ship was constitutionally confirmed and established in 1866 by the
83. What Shall We Do Next?, N.Y. TimEs, May 28,1870, at 4. The New York Tunes sympa-
thized with the moderate House bill, which "effect[ed] the contemplated purpose and there
stop[ped]," and called the Senate bill a "needless elaboration [of] all the points in the House
bill." Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, N.Y. Trmns, May 23, 1870, at 4.
84. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3664 (1870).
85. EVERE r SwmNEY, SUPPRESSiNG TmE Ku KLux KLAN: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
RECONSTRUCrION AMENDMENTS, 1870-1877, at 103-04 (1987); Robert A. Horn, National Con-
trol of Congressional Elections 153-54 (1942) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University).
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Civil Rights Act and in 1868 by the Fourteenth Amendment, the natu-
ralization of foreign immigrants remained largely state business. Be-
cause neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment clearly
conferred the right to vote upon citizens or made suffrage part of the
integral rights of national citizenry, the states were left to regulate
matters of suffrage, including those regarding naturalized aliens.86
Thus, controlling the naturalization process in places like New York
City, where immigrants came in large numbers, meant controlling of
new voters. But the Democrats posed a particular threat to the
Republicans in New York City, largely because the Democratic
machine controlled the bulk of the city's new immigrant votes. With
the elections of 1870 coming, the elimination of fraud in Northern
elections became an urgent issue for the Republicans. The Republi-
cans in Congress proposed to make the process of naturalization a
federal matter and to eliminate such corruption in elections.
The Naturalization Act of 1870, the second of the voting rights
Enforcement Acts between 1870 and 1872, originally had nothing to
do with the Fifteenth Amendment. The bill primarily established a
national system for naturalizing aliens. But the congressional debate
over the bill led to the unusual explosion of disagreements among the
Republicans on a number of issues: the relation between naturaliza-
tion, citizenship, and the right to vote; race and qualifications of na-
tional citizenship; universal suffrage; and the future of American
democracy. Because the naturalization bill was mostly discussed
within the Republican camp of the Senate, the debate revealed much
about the dilemma of the Republican party in its fight for the princi-
ple of political equality. It was clear that some party leaders had re-
86. There was no uniform regulation imposed by the federal government on enfranchising
an alien, before or after he was naturalized or declared the intention to be naturalized. Naturali-
zation was left to the states, as was enfranchisement. Alien suffrage varied from state to state.
In 1848, the Wisconsin Constitution gave aliens the right to vote once they declared their inten-
tion for naturalization. In 1850, Indiana allowed aliens to vote one year after declaring their
intention, but they had to wait five years before they could be naturalized. Illinois tried to
extend the franchise to aliens, but the proposal was defeated in 1848 by a narrow margin. The
Michigan Constitution of 1850 allowed white male citizens to vote only after residing six months
in the state, and disallowed foreigners to vote. The Kentucky Constitution of 1850 required two-
years of residence before aliens could vote. In 1857, Minnesota imposed a six-month-residence
requirement on foreign immigrants who wanted to vote. In 1859, Oregon began to allow aliens
to vote after they declared their intention and lived in the state one year, an additional six
months was required for the natives; but Chinese, blacks, and mulattoes were specifically ex-
cluded from voting. In 1859, Massachusetts amended her constitution to require aliens to live in
the state for two years after naturalization in order to vote. "In the middle states the foreigner
was being enticed with brief residence periods and even the franchise itself." KIRK H. PORTER,
A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 113-34 (1918); JAMES H. KFrTNER, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITzENsImP, 1608-1870, at 344-45 (1978).
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fused to commit the party to universal suffrage on the ground that it
would damage the party and its influence in local economies and
politics. 87
The naturalization bill was first introduced into the House by
Noah Davis, a radical Republican from New York, on June 13, 1870,
just two weeks after the first Enforcement Act had become law. Ac-
cording to Davis, the measure was to amend the existing naturaliza-
tion laws, to punish fraudulent practices in the naturalization process,
and to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over controversial
cases concerning naturalization. It was a simple, straightforward bill,
with no reference to voting rights.88 Although some Democrats
voiced their opposition, the Republican majority passed the bill with-
out difficulty.89
When the Senate took up the bill a week later, Senator Roscoe
Conkling, a New York Republican and a member of the Judiciary
Committee, presented the House bill with "an amendment in the na-
ture of [a] substitute." 90 His substitute was much more complicated
and substantial than the original House bill. Eleven of the 13 sections
of Conkling's bill dealt with naturalization matters, encompassing all
the details regarding procedures, manners, fees, qualifications for nat-
uralization and citizenship, and the punishments for frauds in the nat-
uralization process. Like the House bill, it specified that only federal
courts were authorized to handle offenses concerning naturalization
practices. 91 But the Conkling bill went beyond the issue of naturaliza-
tion and into the sphere of voting. In the last two sections, the bill
empowered federal district or circuit court judges to designate depu-
87. Few studies of enforcement give extensive attention to the naturalization bill. Others
simply ignore it. I believe the bill had a logical and political connection to the first and third
Enforcement Acts. More importantly, the debate over the bill substantially reflected Republi-
can perceptions of political equality in a larger socioeconomic context.
88. Davis' bill had only four sections. The first provided punishment for fraudulent and
false oaths, affirmation or affidavits regarding the naturalization of aliens; the second punished
false conduct in applying for citizenship; the third punished the use of naturalization certificates
falsely obtained; and the fourth provided that the U.S. courts would hear cases relating to the
act. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4366-67 (1870).
89. As in the case of the first Enforcement Act, the vote was strictly partisan, with 130 yeas,
47 nays and 53 not voting. Id at 4368.
90. Id. at 4834-36.
91. The first five sections of the bill detailed the procedures, residence qualifications, meth-
ods, time, and place to apply for naturalization by aliens. The sixth and seventh sections pro-
posed regulations regarding the use of the citizenship certificates and the naturalization of the
children of naturalized citizens. Section 8 authorized that certificates of citizenship be uniformly
issued by federal courts. Section 9 punished fraudulent uses of the certificates. Section 10 pun-
ished those who disturbed the commission of federal judges. Section 11 regulated fees for natu-
ralization. ld
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ties who had to attend all places fixed for voter registration in each
precinct in cities and towns of more than 20,000 people. These depu-
ties were designated to watch registration, voting, and counting, and
"to challenge any name proposed to be registered and any vote of-
fered" (section 12). The bill also empowered federal marshals to ap-
point as many deputies as needed to keep order at the polls, and to
make all necessary arrests "for any offense or breach of the peace
committed in their view" when congressional elections were held (sec-
tion 13). Essentially, the measure would require a naturalized citizen
to present his certificate, authorized by a federal court, before
voting.92
In the long run, Conkling's bill might be understood as a genuine
effort to modernize the federal system administering naturalization. 93
Even for the time, the bill contained a special constitutional meaning:
empower the federal government to control the process of recruiting
new American citizens, since national citizenship was confirmed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose of the bill was to remove
the states' sole jurisdiction over citizenship and to have the national
courts uniformly handle the process of conferring citizenship upon
naturalized aliens. Conkling declared, "the bill does nothing except to
purify the process of naturalization, and ... to render more assured, to
appreciate, to set a new value upon the rights of American citizenship
... -94 But given the political context of 1870, the bill was enacted for
more immediate partisan purposes: to break Democratic voting power
92. Id. at 4835-36.
93. According to Frank G. Franklin, the issue of establishing a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion in the United States was raised in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, but the idea was
rejected. In every naturalization law made before 1861, the authority to process naturalization
was given to the state and federal courts; in practice, however, naturalization was conducted
mainly by individual states. The Naturalization Act of 1790, the nation's first, permitted free
white persons to be naturalized after two years of residence in the United States and "upon
application to any common law court of record in the state where they had resided for one year."
FRANKLIN G. FRANKLIN, Ti- LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 48 (1906). The Naturalization Act of 1795 required a longer residence and a preliminary
declaration of intention and renunciation of former allegiance and of any title of nobility, but
retained the color requirement. Id. at 70. The act specified that "the supreme, superior, district
or circuit court of some one of the states or of the territories ... or a circuit or district court of
the United States" was empowered to naturalize aliens. Id. at 71 n.28. The Naturalization Act
of 1798, which was produced under the fear that the United States might get involved in the
European war, only amended the length of the residence requirement. Id. at 93. The Naturali-
zation Act of 1802 again kept the color requirement and required a registration of all aliens in
the office "of some federal or state court." Id. at 107. The subsequent naturalization acts of
1813 and 1824 made no substantial change in the authority of naturalization. Id. at 117-28, 167-
83. Several attempts were made in 1845 and in the late 1850s to amend the naturalization laws,
but no bill passed Congress.
94. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5121 (1870).
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in New York and to prevent falsely naturalized aliens from voting in
Northern congressional elections, especially in the big northern cities
with their high ratio of alien populations.
Neither Conkling nor any other member of the Committee ex-
plained why the last two sections were added to the bill. But the ra-
tionale underlying the arrangement was obvious: to have federal
officials be present at the polls in populous cities to challenge foreign-
born voters who were unlawfully naturalized. Conkling may have cal-
culated that such an arrangement was a logical extension of the first
Enforcement Act, which had provided the federal machinery to en-
force black suffrage in the South. Conkling also may have felt that,
since the federal government had the power to control naturalization
(which in turn would lead to federal citizenship), it was the federal
government's duty to review the voting qualifications of naturalized
citizens at congressional elections. Whatever the reason, the last two
sections of Conkling's bill linked the issues of naturalization, citizen-
ship, and suffrage to the first Enforcement Act. Technically, the two
sections regarding federal supervision of elections expanded the sub-
stance of the first Enforcement Act without going beyond its princi-
ples. These two sections also became the stepping stone for the
Enforcement Act of February 28, 1871, which would give specific at-
tention to Northern election fraud.
The Democrats immediately saw this measure as a Republican
effort to block their efforts to recruit voters from naturalized citizens
in the North and to help reinvigorate the Republican party in New
York.95 But much of the Democratic attack focused on naturalization,
especially the power of the states to naturalize aliens. Only Thomas
Bayard of Delaware challenged the two sections concerning federal
supervision at the polls. Bayard opposed Conkling's attempt to link
suffrage, citizenship and naturalization, arguing that suffrage "may or
may not be one of the incidents of citizenship" and should be decided
by the states in which the naturalized citizens resided. Since the Fif-
teenth Amendment only limited states' rights to regulate suffrage on
color, race, and previous conditions of servitude, it did not give the
federal government "unlimited power" to supervise elections in the
North.96
Democrats were a weak minority party in the Senate and
presented no threat to the passage of the bill. The real challenge was
95. Id. at 4837-40 (statements of Willard Saulsbury & George Vickers).
96. Id. at 5175 (statement of Thomas Bayard).
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from the Republican party itself: many Republicans disliked the bill,
and some of them loathed it. Republicans from the West and Midwest
echoed the Democratic charges, calling the bill "an obstruction to nat-
uralization." The West and Midwest wanted new immigrants, and in
many states laws were passed to shorten the residency periods to at-
tract permanent settlement. The lengthy and meticulous process of
federal control of naturalization would stop the states from adopting a
more liberal policy in this regard.97 Morton of Indiana, usually a sup-
porter of federal action on behalf of black rights, complained about
the complications in the proposed naturalization process and asked
not to go beyond the House bill. James B. Howell of Iowa assailed the
bill as an effort by New York Republicans to promote their own self-
interests. Others warned that an unfriendly attitude toward natural-
ized citizens would cost the party popularity among immigrants and
damage Republican forces at state and local levels.98 Ironically, the
Republican opposition to the bill was based mostly on the ground that
the states had the right to regulate naturalization. This view repre-
sented an emerging ideological split among Republicans on the defini-
tions of state and federal power. It also indicated the political
difficulties that the party would confront in its future enforcement
program.
Under pressure, Conkling agreed to modify his proposal on the
basis of the original House bill, but did not remove the last two sec-
tions since no Republican opposed them. But right before the Senate
reached an agreement on the final version of the bill, Charles Sumner
rose and proposed to add to the revised Conkling bill a new section,
"[t]hat all acts of Congress relating to naturalization be, and the same
are hereby, amended by striking out the word 'white' wherever it oc-
curs, so that in naturalization there shall be no distinction of race or
color."99
Sumner's logic was simple: since a color-blind American citizen-
ship had been established by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was necessary to remove racial discrimina-
tion from the national law of naturalization. Sumner probably made
this proposal to correct existing federal naturalization laws, which per-
mitted only "free white persons" to be naturalized. Such a proposal
97. Id. at 5115-17 (statement of Oliver P. Morton).
98. Id. at 5118-19 (statement of Carl Schurz).
99. Id. at 5121.
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was consistent with Sumner's anti-discrimination record.'0o But unex-
pectedly, his amendment became an ideological time bomb that com-
pletely destroyed the agreement on the bill and almost killed it.
If Sumner's proposal became law, no foreign immigrants entering
the United States could be barred from applying for naturalization on
the basis of color and race. Their naturalization would, after a certain
period, enable them to obtain United States citizenship and, conse-
quently, the rights accompanying it, including the right to vote. Such a
proposal was absolutely unacceptable to Republicans from Western
states, who were already engaged in heated debates about the issue of
Chinese coolie labor, as waves of contracted Chinese workers rushed
into the West and Rocky Mountain regions. Although it was still ten
years away from the first anti-Chinese violence in the West, the anti-
Chinese sentiment had become phenomenal.' 0' The Chinese question
had come up during the debates on the Fifteenth Amendment and the
issue was settled by a compromise: to leave the states the right to reg-
ulate nativity tests for potential voters. California and Oregon re-
jected the amendment; Nevada ratified it only after state Republicans
were assured that the amendment would not enfranchise the Chi-
nese.'0 2 Under such circumstances, accepting Sumner's proposal
would mean political suicide for Republicans in the Far West. Thus,
100. The first naturalization act, passed by Congress in 1790, said that only "free white per-
sons" could be naturalized as American citizens. Although naturalization laws were changed
several times, no proposal had ever been raised to remove the word "white" from the existing
laws. Sumner was the first Senator to challenge racial discrimination in naturalization. For the
interpretations of "free white persons" and cases concerning this provision, see LUELLA GETYs,
THE LAW OF CrIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 62-69 (1934).
101. According to Roger Daniels, significant Chinese migration to the United States began
with the California gold rush of 1849 and ended with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in
May 1882. The total number of the Chinese entering the United States during this period was
nearly 300,000 and about 100,000 Chinese arrived from 1849 to 1870. ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN
AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 9, 29, 39, 69 (1988).
Stanford M. Lyman offers a smaller figure. According to his calculation, during the unrestricted
period of Chinese immigration (1852-1882), about 100,000 Chinese men and 8,848 Chinese wo-
men entered the United States. STANFORD M. LYMAN, THE ASIAN IN THE WEST 27-28 (1970).
But both authors agree that over 90% of these Chinese were adult males. The Chinese issue
started as a regional concern in the early 1860s, but it soon became a national issue as the Cali-
fornia Republicans lost their control of the state power in 1867 partly for their resolution in
favor of voluntary immigration, which was interpreted by the voters as "pro-Chinese" statement.
Thus, between 1868 and 1871, California Republicans opposed Chinese immigration and called
on the federal government to halt their coming. By July 1870, some anti-Chinese demonstra-
tions and mass meetings had been held in San Francisco and put pressure on the state
lawmakers, who enacted anti-Chinese legislation and ordinances at the state and municipal
levels. The first large-scale anti-Chinese violence occurred in Denver on October 31, 1880. Wil-
liam Gillette notes that in California in 1870 there were half a million whites, 49,310 Chinese,
and only 4,272 blacks. GILLETTE, supra note 2, at 154; LYMAN, supra, at 18, 27-28.
102. GILLETrE, supra note 2, at 54, 77-78, 154-58.
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as soon as Sumner's proposal was made, it was immediately engulfed
by criticism and opposition from Western Republicans.
William Stewart, who had just led the party's fight for the Fif-
teenth Amendment and the first Enforcement Act, was the most vo-
cal. Stewart claimed that he did not oppose protecting the civil rights
of Chinese laborers, but frowned on having them naturalized and sub-
sequently enfranchised. For Stewart, black enfranchisement was "an
act of justice," because
[t]he negro was among us. This was his native land. He was born
here. He had a right to protection here. He had a right to the ballot
here. He was an American and a Christian, as much so as any of the
rest of the people of the country. He loved the American flag.
Although he was ignorant, although he had been a slave, it became
important that he should be enfranchised, so that he might protect
himself in this great strife that we always have and always must have
in a free government, where every man must take care of himself. 10 3
But, Stewart said, the Chinese were entirely different, "pagans in reli-
gion, monarchists in theory," who "look with utter contempt upon all
modern forms as dangerous innovations." To enfranchise the Chinese
meant to subject the "the political destiny of the Pacific coast" to ig-
norant Chinese laborers. 1° 4
George H. Williams of Oregon, who later became Grant's attor-
ney general in charge of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, asked
that the Chinese be excluded from Sumner's proposal. Williams saw
Chinese naturalization as a potential threat to the free labor ideology
and practice in America. The Chinese laborers were an organized la-
bor force, which in Williams's view, could be equated with the old
Southern slavery and turned into an organized political force if citi-
zenship and suffrage were granted to them. Williams warned his col-
leagues that once the Chinese were enfranchised, "the black and white
laborers of the country should combine to crush the [Republican]
party which invites competition with their labor from China" at the
next election.'0 5
The Republican division over the Chinese issue was ironic. The
line that once distinguished radicals from moderates and conserva-
tives on the race issue was blurred on the Chinese issue. Sumner was
the strongest defender of his proposal. Two of Sumner's comrades
were Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and William Sprague of Rhode Is-
land. Trumbull, normally more conservative, charged both Stewart
103. CONo. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5152 (1870).
104. Id. at 5150.
105. Id. at 5158.
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and Williams with racism and reminded them that it was "not long
since the color of the skin being black deprived an individual of all his
rights.' 10 6 Sprague, a textile manufacturer, supported Sumner's pro-
posal mainly because it would eventually enable America to benefit
from cheap Chinese labor. Carl Schurz, once identified as a radical
and increasingly called a liberal Republican, disagreed with Stewart
and Williams, but persuaded Sumner to withdraw the proposed color-
blind naturalization law because it was "not yet fully matured" and
"serve[d] to obstruct the passage of a useful bill.' 10 7
Even Henry Wilson of Massachusetts shared the Western fear of
Chinese labor. Well aware of the controversies surrounding the use of
Chinese strikebreakers in Massachusetts, Wilson refused to support
Sumner's proposal. He opposed the bill because he wanted to break
up the importation of Chinese labor, which was a "modern slave-trade
system" used by big corporations to challenge "the free labor of this
country, North and South.' 108 Oliver P. Morton, who led several ma-
jor Senate debates over issues of black rights, told Sumner that ex-
cluding the Chinese from suffrage did not contradict the Declaration
of Independence because the Chinese did not have a natural right to
enjoy American rights.10 9
For opponents of Sumner's proposal, the issue of Chinese natu-
ralization and suffrage was unlike the issue of black suffrage, which
was "an act of justice." Naturalizing and subsequently enfranchising
the Chinese was, in Williams' words, "a practical problem," not "a
question of principle."110 The local anti-Chinese pressure, the fear of
106. Id. at 5164.
107. Id. at 5159. Schurz actually opposed all of the racial remarks made by Stewart and
Williams against the Chinese immigrants. He saw no threat from the growth of the Chinese
immigrant population. Instead of shutting off the Chinese, Schurz suggested that the country
should try to Americanize the Chinese immigrants and, through them, to "propagandize" the
American habits of consumption in China, and eventually to open a new market for American
products in China. Id. at 5159-60. William Sprague saw the Chinese labor force as part of a
growing international economic system, which would bring to the United States much-needed
profits and cheap labor. while Stewart and Williams appeared more like provincial politicians,
Schurz and Sprague were surely among the best minds of the Republican party in projecting the
globalization of American economy, which would be partly materialized in the next century,
although not quite in China. Id. at 5170-71 (statement of William Sprague).
108. Id. at 5161-62; FONER, supra note 20, at 483. Wilson's main point was that Sumner's
proposal blocked the passage of the naturalization bill, which was important for the party.
Although Wilson said that he would not oppose enfranchising the Chinese if they came volunta-
rily and were willing to assimilate into American culture, he did echo Stewart's anti-Chinese
remarks by defining China as "a country of cheap labor, a country of paganism, [and] a country
with a civilization wholly distinct from our own...." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5175
(1870).
109. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5175 (1870).
110. Id. at 5158.
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the revival of slave labor because of the unrestricted immigration of
Chinese labor, the prospect of a great number of ignorant Chinese
voters controlled by anti-free labor interests, the white workers mov-
ing into the Democratic camp in response to that prospect, and the
dark image of Chinese political culture-all scared the anti-Chinese
Republicans and made them put aside the principle of universal polit-
ical equality and set limits for the enjoyment of American democracy.
But excluding the Chinese from naturalization prompted a question: if
a Chinese alien could be prohibited from becoming an American citi-
zen and obtaining the right to vote because of his race, what was
wrong with the Democrats who wanted to exclude blacks from suf-
frage for the same reason? To avoid such a dilemma, the Republicans
resorted to the theory of constitutional origins, as Stewart's argument
showed. Blacks were citizens of the United States and entitled to
vote. Most Republicans agreed that the Chinese should be ranked as
a race culturally and politically insufficient to acquire the status of
American citizenship and the rights attached to it.
The final vote on the bill was dramatic. Before Sumner's propo-
sal was called for a final vote, Democratic Senator Willard Saulsbury
proposed, in an attempt to defeat the entire bill, that both Chinese
and Africans be excluded from naturalization. The majority of
Republicans immediately voted down the amendment,"' but the
Democratic proposal alerted the Republicans. To show the party's
firm stance on black equality and "save the practical good.. . rather
than endanger all," Willard Warner of Alabama proposed to add a
new section to the current bill so that naturalization could be ex-
tended "to the aliens of African nativity and to persons of African
descent." The new proposal won a majority Senate approval and be-
came the last section of the Naturalization Act of 1870.112 After the
vote, Lyman Trumbull tried to amend Warner's section by putting
"persons born in the Chinese empire" under the protection of
Warner's amendment, but the effort was voted down by an over-
111. Id. at 5160.
112. Id. at 5176. Warner thought the Republican opposition to Sumner's proposal was wise
on the part of the Senate, equivalent to Lincoln's decision to postpone issuing his Proclamation
of Emancipation until the right time. Warner's proposal read, "And be it further enacted. That
the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of Afri-
can descent."
The vote was 21 yeas (20 Republicans and 1 Democrat), 20 nays (12 Republicans and 8
Democrats) and 31 not voting (29 Republicans, 1 Democrat, and 1 Conservative). Sumner,
Trumbull, Zachariah Chandler, Morton and Sprague were among the supporters, with Conkling,
Wilson, Stewart, and Williams against the proposal. Black Senator Hiram Revels was absent in
this voting. Id.
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whelming Republican majority.113 When Sumner's proposal came up
for a final decision, many Republicans did not vote at all, while 19
Republicans joined the Democrats to defeat the proposal.114
Probably because much of the debate was focused upon the Chi-
nese question, the two sections regarding federal supervision at the
polls were entirely ignored until the last minute. Again, it was Demo-
crat Thomas Bayard who questioned the constitutionality of the two
sections. But Bayard's question attracted no attention. 115 On July 8,
1870, the Senate passed the naturalization bill,116 and a few days later,
the House accepted the Senate's amendments. On July 14, President
Grant signed the bill.
The final version of the naturalization bill remained largely the
same as the original House bill, except for the last three sections that
the Senate added. Sections 5 and 6 specified the duties and powers of
federal officials at the polls in large cities, thus strengthening the pro-
visions prescribed in the first Enforcement Act.
In a way, the Naturalization Act of 1870 (which was technically
the second Enforcement Act) had no long-term impact on the course
of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, especially in the South. This
was because of its supplementary nature and the brief life of the two
enforcement sections, which, in less than one year, would be super-
seded by the third Enforcement Act of February 28, 1871. But the act
significantly linked the issues of suffrage, citizenship, and naturaliza-
tion. The debate showed continued Republican support for black suf-
frage and political equality. It also showed that, while the party was
still held together by the issues of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
the Republican principle of political equality was subject to the prag-
matic needs of the party's local constituencies. It highlighted North-
113. Id. at 5177. Trumbull's motive for extending naturalization to the Chinese was very
complicated. His real purpose seemed to be to oppose African immigration rather than to natu-
ralize the Chinese. He thought African naturalization would open "the whole continent of Af-
rica, where are to be found the most degraded examples of man that exist on the face of the
earth, pagans, cannibals, men who worship beasts, who do not compare in intelligence at all with
the Chinese." But the majority was unmoved by his warning and defeated his proposal with 9
yeas, 31 nays and 32 absent. Id.
114. The vote on Sumner's proposal was 12 yeas (all Republicans including Sumner,
Sprague, Trumbull, and Fowler, who was normally a very conservative Republican), 26 nays (7
Democrats and 19 Republicans including Stewart, Williams, Conkling, Zachariah Chandler and
Henry Wilson), and 34 not voting (3 Democrats and 31 Republicans). The bulk of the votes
against Sumner's proposal was Republican. Id.
115. Bayard's question was finally referred to the Committee of the Whole and had no fur-
ther result. Id. at 5176-77.
116. The vote was 33 yeas (all Republicans), 8 nays (1 Republican and 7 Democrats) and 31
absent (26 Republicans and 5 Democrats and Conservatives). Hiram R. Revels was again ab-
sent. Id. at 5177.
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ern concerns about political corruption and immigrant votes, which
would became important issues to the liberal Republicans.
Constitutionally, the last section of Naturalization Act of 1870
was crucial for opening the door for African immigration, especially
those settling in the Caribbean. But since Republican supporters were
assured that few Africans could come to America at that time, the
section served largely as a political gesture to accord with what
Warner called "a ripened public opinion" on black rights rather than
as a sincere policy to attract Africans to America.117
Watching the debate closely, Frederick Douglass praised Sumner
for upholding the republican principles of political equality on the
Chinese question. But the "bitter contest" among the Republicans
made him doubt how endurable the party's future policy on black
rights would be:
A bitter contest, I fear, is before us on this question. Prejudice,
price of race, narrow views of political economy, are on one, hu-
manity, civilization and sound policy are on the other. In your posi-
tion I see the value of fixed principles. While others hesitate you go
forward. While others are entangled in the meshes of temporary
expediency you can promptly move forward in the light and har-
mony of those principles which are broad, grand and eternal. 118
IV. THREE OTHER ENFORCEMENT LAWS
The first two Enforcement Acts were enacted not only for ideo-
logical reasons, but to meet Democratic challenges in the elections of
1870, in both the North and the South. To the Republicans, the 1870
elections would test their strength for the 1872 presidential election.
Soon after the second Naturalization Act took effect, President Grant,
writing to Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, expressed his con-
cerns for the upcoming election. He added that "New York, the larg-
est, is certainly the most important state to secure a fair election, and
to secure to the Republican party if it is right. If it is not right a ma-
jority of the legal voters are the ones to so declare." 119 The Northern
press, such as the Chicago Tribune, welcomed the Naturalization Act
117. Oliver P. Morton made it clear that "there are some who have come from the West
India islands who are desirous of being naturalized, but so far as Africa is concerned there are
none that will come." Id.
118. Letter from Frederick Douglass to Charles Sumner, Rochester (July 6, 1870) (quoted in
3 LinM AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 9, at 222-23).
119. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Roscoe Conkling (Aug. 22, 1870) (on fie with the Ros-
coe Conkling Papers, Library of Congress).
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and its provisions for the federal supervision of elections in large
cities.120
On the election day of October 18, 1870, the federal agencies in
New York, led by Noah Davis, who had resigned from the House and
become the district attorney in the southern district of New York, car-
ried out the Enforcement Acts. Twenty-six individuals were arrested,
including a member of the Tammany Hall General Committee. A
master list of 15,000 suspected names was compiled for poll watch-
ers.121 According to the New York Times, voter registration in the city
was reduced by twenty to thirty thousand.122 Despite the enforcement,
the results of the 1870 elections were less encouraging than Republi-
cans had either expected or hoped. Although Democrats in New
York City failed to increase their seats due to the effectiveness of the
Enforcement Acts, upstate Democrats won four more congressional
seats.' 23 In the 1870 elections, the total number of the Democratic
seats in the House rose from 69 in the third session of the Forty-First
Congress to 100 in the first session of the Forty-Second Congress. 124
The political situation in the South was equally threatening for
the Republicans. With the aid of Ku Klux Klan terrorism, Democrats
quickly returned to the center of the Southern political stage. In
Georgia, Democrats won eighty percent of the seats in the state legis-
lature and most of the congressional seats. General Dudley Du Bois,
a leading Georgia klansman, was elected to Congress from the eastern
district, where Klan intimidation was dominant. In Florida, the Re-
publican majority was substantially reduced because black voters were
threatened if they voted Republican. 125 The Alabama Democrats
won the lower house of the state legislature. Texas Democrats won
three of the state's four seats in the House. 126 Meanwhile, the first
120. The Chicago Tribune, after pointing out two or three minor weak points of the act,
believed that if the law was "fairly and firmly enforced at the next election, every honest and
decent Democrat throughout the land, as well as every Republican, will breathe freer, in the
consciousness that one of the chief dangers to the republic has been removed." The Law Against
Election Fraud, Cia. Tam., Oct. 19, 1870, at 2.
121. SWINNEY, supra note 85, at 107.
122. The Registry Frauds, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1870, at 2.
123. Swm, mY, supra note 85, at 111. Democrats in New York City had six seats in the House
and the number remained unchanged in 1870 elections, but the total number of the New York
Democratic seats in the House rose from 12 in the Forty-First Congress to 16 in the Forty-
Second Congress. The Total Registration Largely Less than Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1870,
at 5.
124. These numbers are calculated from the rosters of the Congressional Globe for the Forty-
First and Forty-Second Congresses.
125. TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 241-42.
126. According to Eric Foner, the defeat of the Republican party was due to a cluster of
factors. In Georgia and Alabama, Democrats took advantage of the Republican infighting and
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Enforcement Act was ineffectively carried out in the South. President
Grant called attention to the need for enforcement, but he did very
little to implement the law. 127
At the end of the election, the Republicans were probably more
alarmed by the Democratic gains in the North than by the Klan out-
rages in the South. Although the party maintained majorities in both
Houses, a reversal was clearly possible in two years if Republicans
remained idle on enforcement. The election result also made the first
two Enforcement Acts inadequate in many ways. Just as the New
York Times predicted, amendments to the first two Enforcement Acts
were soon introduced into Congress at the beginning of the Third Ses-
sion of the Forty-First Congress. 128
The new enforcement bill, as reported by John Bingham from the
House Judiciary Committee on February 15, 1871, aimed at providing
technical details about enforcement machinery, which were believed
to be missing or lacking from the first two Enforcement Acts. The bill
had 20 sections, eighteen of which were devoted to details regarding
the duties, performance, and power of federal enforcement officials
and courts, and to punishments for violations of the law.129 Compared
demoralization. Violence was important, but varied from state to state. In Missouri, West Vir-
ginia, Virginia, and Tennessee, the party split. In the Deep South, violence played a more signifi-
cant role. But around 1870, the Klan "devastate[d] the Republican organization in many local
communities." FONER, supra note 20, at 441-44; TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 273.
127. TRELEAsE, supra note 21, at 385-86. Later, Charles Sumner strongly criticized Grant for
his indifference to the first Enforcement Act, which allowed the Ku Klux Klan to develop rapidly
in the South. In a letter to Gerrit Smith, Sumner refused to endorse Grant's renomination and
said that "[i]t is my solemn judgt ... that the much-criticized Ku Klux legislation of the last
Congress would have been entirely unnecessary, if this Republican President had shown a decent
energy in enforcing existing law and in manifesting sympathy with the oppressed there." Letter
from Charles Sumner to Gerrit Smith (Aug. 20, 1871), reprinted in 2 SELECTErD LasTrus OF
CHARLES SUMNER 569-70 (Beverly W. Palmer ed., 1990).
128. The General Results, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1870, at 1. Between December 1870 and
January 1871, Republicans in both Houses introduced several bills for discussion. CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 170 (1870) (John Charles Churchill's and Thomas A. Jenckes's
bills); id. at 378 (Churchill's second bill); id. at 1014 (Roscoe Conkling's bill).
129. The third Enforcement Act was basically an enlargement of section 20 of the Enforce-
ment Act of May 31, 1870. In the new act, nineteen sections were added following the original
section 20, which made fraudulent practice in voting and registration a federal crime and re-
quired all state laws regarding congressional elections to observe the federal law. The act re-
pealed sections 5 and 6 of the Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870 (section 18), but re-enacted
those sections in its second section. The Act detailed the procedures of appointing chief supervi-
sors by circuit and district courts (sections 13 and 3); prescribed payment and the duties of super-
visors in watching voting, registration, and counting; challenged doubtful voters, inspecting the
registry, and making arrests (sections 4-6); empowered the supervisors and marshals to appoint
their deputies (sections 8, 12); and provided penalties against offenders who molested enforce-
ment officials and officials who neglected their duties (sections 7, 9, 10, 11). The act authorized
circuit and federal courts to hear cases arising under the law and allowed such cases to be re-
moved from state courts to federal courts upon petitions (sections 14-17). The last section (sec-
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to the previous Enforcement Acts, the new bill had three radical fea-
tures: the establishment of a powerful national system of election su-
pervision with federal marshals, supervisors, and their deputies
watching voting and registration processes; the removal of the all
cases arising under the law from the state courts to federal courts
(which essentially invalidated all state laws that encouraged false prac-
tices in voter registration); and the requirement of written ballots for
congressional elections. The new enforcement bill obviously targeted
the states' power to regulate elections. The political contest of 1870
showed that Northern fraud and Southern Klanism were equally detri-
mental to Republican efforts to maintain the taxpayers' rights and the
party's power. For some, the Northern election fraud was even more
threatening. Any military attempt to overthrow liberties, declared Il-
linois Republican Burton C. Cook, "is far more remote than the possi-
bility that the fountain of all law shall be poisoned and corrupted by
such frauds .... -130 The new enforcement bill, in Bingham's view,
was to equip the national government with some kind of "power of
self-preservation" against the state laws "acting separately and with-
out violence" to "demolish the national government." 131
Democrats in both houses saw the bill as the Republican party's
"desperate extremity to retain power."1 32 But the Democrats failed to
filibuster against the bill, and it passed both houses with strong sup-
port from the Republican majority. President Grant approved the bill
on February 28, 1871.133
While fighting to get the third Enforcement Act past Congress to
suppress election fraud in the North, the Republican party was fight-
ing a different battle in the South: suppressing the Ku Klux Klan. In
1870 and 1871, Klan terrorism continued to run rampant. A campaign
tion 19) required written or printed ballots for electing representatives in Congress. Act of Feb.
28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433, 433-40 (1871).
130. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1280-81 (1870).
131. Id. at 1284-85.
132. Democrats accused the Republicans of using their legislative power to promote partisan
interests. For the Democrats, the legislative power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment was
only "accessory" to the first provision of the Amendment. Thus, it should be "latent, and must
forever remain so," as long as the states did not take action against black voters on the basis of
color and race. The enforcement bill would only destroy state sovereignty and "lead to monar-
chy, aristocracy, anarchy and revolution." I&a at 1641 (statement of Eugene Casserly); id. at 1273
(statement of Stephen L. Mayhem); id. at 1277-79 (statement of Michael Kerr); id. at 1639 (state-
ment of George Vickers).
133. The final vote in the House was 144 yeas (all Republicans), 64 nays (4 Republicans and
60 Democrats and Conservatives), and 32 not voting (27 Republicans and 5 Democrats and
Conservatives). Id. at 1285. In the Senate, the vote was 39 yeas (38 Republicans and 1 Demo-
crat), 10 nays (1 Republican and 9 Democrats and Conservatives), and 25 absents (22 Republi-
cans and 3 Democrats). The black Senator Hiram R. Revels voted yea. Id. at 1655.
[Vol. 70:1013
1995] THE MAKING OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT LAWS, 1870-1872 1049
of violence and terrorism against black voters had begun in North and
South Carolina. By the spring of 1871, a delegation from South Caro-
lina informed President Grant that state authorities could no longer
maintain order. Meanwhile, in North Carolina, Republican legislators
were ousted from the state legislature. Governor Holden was im-
peached and convicted for misusing martial law.134 Harper's Weekly
urged the Republican-controlled Congress to take immediate actions
to protect black voters who "would prevent the national government
[from] falling into the hands of the Ku Klux party."'135 President
Grant also pressed Congress to pass an effective act to control the
Klan. Grant wrote to James Blaine, the Speaker of the House, and
asked Congress to give "immediate attention" to "a deplorable state
of affairs existing in some portions of the South." Even if Congress
could only discuss a single subject in the coming session, Grant urged
that it should be on "providing means for the protection of life and
property in those sections of the country."'136
To suppress the Klan outrages, Republicans again resorted to
"the broad conception of national authority spawned by the Civil War
and embodied in the postwar amendments."'1 37 Because the Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment were applied to states'
actions against the civil rights of blacks, the anti-black crimes con-
ducted by private individuals (in other words, the Klan), which con-
sisted of the main bulk of Southern outrages, went unpunished.
Radical Republicans believed that the only way to stop the Klan out-
rages was to enact, as Benjamin F. Butler put it, "strong and vigorous
laws... promptly executed by a firm hand, armed, when need be, with
military power."' 38 The protection of black civil rights would require
national action.
Republicans presented the anti-Klan bill, later known as the Ku
Klux Force Act of April 20, 1871, in the House soon after the First
Session of the Forty-Second Congress convened in March 1871.139
134. FoNER, supra note 20, at 431-44; WILLIAM GIL-ETrE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUC-
TION, 1869-1879, at 92 (1979).
135. The Ku-Klux Klan, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 1, 1871, at 282.
136. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to James G. Blaine (Mar. 9, 1871) (on file with the Ulysses
S. Grant Papers, Series 2, Reel 3, Library of Congress).
137. FoNER, supra note 20, at 455.
138. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (statement of Benjamin F. Butler).
139. while Congress was considering the third Enforcement Act in mid-February, Republi-
cans decided to bring up a strong anti-Klan bill for discussion. Benjamin F. Butler of Massachu-
setts drafted a bill, which was intended to empower the President to suspend habeas corpus, to
remove state officials if their elections were invalid, and to enable federal marshals to remove
disloyal members from federal juries. The Senate passed the bill according to the party caucus'
plan, but the bill failed in the House. Some Republicans, including James A. Garfield and James
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The fourth Enforcement Act since 1870, it was an amalgam of several
propositions. The great variety of subjects covered by the bill made
some moderate Republicans believe that it had absorbed "the entire
jurisdiction of the States over their local and domestic affairs." The
debates were long-and more than eighty members of the House
spoke. After many amendments, the House passed the bill on April 6.
The Senate adopted the bill on April 10 with more than twenty
amendments to perfect the wording. When the bill finally passed both
Houses after two joint conferences, the votes were absolutely partisan.
Grant approved the bill on April 20.140
The final version of the measure was short but retained much of
its original strength. In its first section, the bill authorized federal
courts to hear all cases regarding rights infringements under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Section 2 was the core of the bill. It was actually
an enlargement of section 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
which established the principle of conspiracy in civil rights but had
proved vague and difficult to use in framing indictments. The new
section spelled out more than twenty kinds of specific practices for
which conspiracy was to be illegal, including using force or intimida-
tion to interfere with voting rights in federal elections.141 This section
virtually outlawed the Klan and similar groups that conspired to de-
prive citizens of their political and civil rights. Sections 3 and 4, which
were very controversial, enlarged the president's power to use military
force to suppress domestic disturbances and to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus when organized conspiracies were powerful enough to
obstruct authorities' execution of the laws. Section 5 required all ju-
G. Blaine, joined the Democrats to defeat the bill, reasoning that it went beyond the limits of
congressional power. TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 387-88.
140. The final vote on the conference report of the bill in the House was 93 yeas (all Repub-
licans), 74 nays (all Democrats) and 63 not voting (49 Republicans and 14 Democrats). CoNG.
GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 808. In the Senate, the vote was 36 yeas (all Republicans), 13 nays
(all Democrats and Conservatives) and 21 absents (20 Republicans and 1 Democrat). Id. at 831.
These figures show that the voting strength of the Republican party in the House was not as
strong as when other enforcement acts were passed. SWINNEY, supra note 85, at 154-79.
141. These practices included conspiracies by force or threat to overthrow the Government
of the United States, to prevent the execution of any law of the United States, to prevent anyone
from accepting or holding federal office, to injure federal officers and their property, to deter
any party or witness in any federal court from testifying, to influence the verdict and indictment
of any juror, to go in disguise upon the public highway to directly and indirectly deprive any
person "of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws," to
prevent "any citizen of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or
advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
as an elector of President or Vice President of the United States, or as a member of the Congress
of the United States .... " Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871) (enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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rors in federal courts to take an oath that they had "never, directly or
indirectly, counselled, advised, or voluntarily aided" any Klan conspir-
acy. Section 6 punished those who aided criminals penalized under
the bill's second section. Section 7 specified that the bill was not un-
derstood to supersede other enforcement acts.142
The Ku Klux Force Act, Eric Foner observed, "pushed Republi-
cans to the outer limits of constitutional change." The Act defined
crimes committed by individuals as offenses punishable under federal
law. 143 Although it was the most effective weapon for the federal gov-
ernment to suppress the Klan activities, the Ku Klux Force Act inten-
sified Republican infighting and, in a sense, accelerated the party's
disunity in its policy toward the South. The Force Act passed when
the liberal Republican movement was on the horizon. The liberals,
composed mostly of former radical Republicans in the Northeast who
were disgusted with the political corruption of the Grant administra-
tion, wanted a conciliatory policy toward the South and due restora-
tion of traditional constitutionalism.144 Naturally, they became the
arch-opponents of the Force Act. Carl Schurz, one of the founders of
the liberal Republican movement and a former supporter of black
rights, called the act "a general crime code for the states." He blamed
blacks for misusing their right of suffrage and therefore causing so
much violence and disorder in the South. Enforcing black suffrage
would not stop violence, Schurz argued; instead, the party should re-
move the political disabilities imposed upon the "good elements" in
the South and make them the party's future partners. He warned the
radical Republicans that the "passing evil" could not be cured "at the
expense of a permanent good.' 45 The Chicago Tribune ridiculed the
Force Act as "attempting to cure a cancer with a compress." The pa-
per blamed the troubles in the South on "the evil fruits of Radicalism"
and urged Republicans to abandon enforcement.' 46
Many other Republicans worried about going beyond the limits
of traditional constitutionalism. Although they welcomed federal
assistance in certain economic and financial arenas such as railroad
land grants and monetary policy, these Republicans opposed the fed-
eral interference with civil rights, a sphere previously reserved for
142. Id. at 13-15.
143. FONER, supra note 20, at 454-55.
144. For details on the intellectual and political origins of the liberal Republicans, see JOHN
G. SPROAT, "THE BEST MEN" LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE 3-71 (1982).
145. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 688-90.
146. The South and its Ailments, CHI. TRuB., Feb. 19, 1872, at 4.
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state authorities. A sweeping enforcement would eventually lead to
the creation of a highly powerful and centralized federal government,
which would, in turn, produce political corruption. "We are working
on the very verge of the Constitution," stated James Garfield, "and
many of our members are breaking over the lines, and, it seems to me,
exposing us, to the double danger, of having our work overthrown by
the Supreme Court and of giving the Democrats new material for in-
juring us, on the stump."'1 47 Even staunch Republican organs, like
Harper's Weekly, expressed concerns about state rights secured by the
Constitution, although it believed that an anti-Klan bill was
necessary. 148
Contrary to the conservative constitutional thinking of the
moderates and liberals, radical Republicans argued that as long as
black voters in the South were neither safe nor free, the federal gov-
ernment was obliged to protect them. "The ballot is no protection
against the bullet when he who holds the ballot is unarmed, homeless
and landless. The vote is a great safeguard against encroachment
upon rights among equals, but is no privilege to a dependant or serf,"
Ben Butler said. In his view, if the Democrats won the 1872 presiden-
tial elections, "all benefits of those Constitutional guarantees will be
taken away from the colored man."'1 49
Although some Republicans, including Charles Sumner, shared
some of the liberals' views and were persuaded to join their anti-
Grant course, they still refused to commit themselves to the liberal
cause, which would abandon the interests of blacks to win a victory in
partisan infighting. For these Republicans, the consolidation of na-
tional authority over citizens' rights should precede the removal of the
former rebels from political office.' 50 Restoring the political rights of
147. Letter from James Garfield to Burke Hinsdale (Mar. 30, 1871) (on file with James A.
Garfield Papers, Library of Congress); GILLETra, supra note 2, at 52.
148. The Ku-Klux Bill, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 15, 1871, at 330.
149. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, THE NEGRO IN POLmCs: REVIEW OF RECENT LEGISLATION FOR
His PROTECTION-DEFENSE OF THE COLORED MAN AGAINST ALL ACCUSERS 6-10 (1871).
150. Sumner faced a difficult dilemma. His dispute with Grant on the issue of Santo Dom-
ingo made him extremely suspicious about the president's sincerity in Republican politics and a
strong opponent of Grant's second term. But he disliked the liberals' idea of universal amnesty,
which he believed to be premature. In his letter to Carl Schurz, Sumner expressed his inability
to make a decision in the coming elections of 1872: "I tremble for my country when I contem-
plate the possibility of this man [Grant] being fastened upon us for another four years.... I also
tremble when I think of reconstruction, with Liberty & Equality, committed for four years to the
tender mercies of the Democrats. Which way is daylight?" Letter from Charles Sumner to Carl
Schurz (Sept. 25, 1971), reprinted in 2 SELECTED LErrERs FROM CHARTES SUMNER, supra note
127, at 573-74. On another occasion, Sumner wrote to Henry W. Longfellow about the "political
sky with the uncertainty as to the future" and his confusion about which position to take to "best
serve the country & especially continue to maintain the rights of the African race." Letter from
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the former rebels would be too premature before the national author-
ity was consolidated, and as the influential New York Republican
John Bigelow put it, the time was far from safe "for the Democrats to
go to Washington. "151
Blacks throughout the country opposed this dismantling of the
Republican party. To them, the party was the necessary political vehi-
cle to carry out the transition from the old constitutional culture to the
new one. Frederick Douglass predicted that once the Republican
party was broken, not only blacks but also "the honor and safety of
the country" would be imperiled. Thus, he asked black voters to use
their votes effectively to support the Republicans. 152
The disputes among the Republicans over the federal authority to
enforce black rights clearly had a negative effect on the Republican
party's course on enforcement, particularly the last Enforcement Act
in 1872. The original bill, introduced by Louisiana Republican Wil-
liam Kellogg on March 11, 1872, was essentially a supplementary bill,
extending to every locale the power and authority given to federal
officers in cities and towns with a population of more than 20,000.153
This power and authority were originally given to the federal officers
by the third Enforcement Act of February 20, 1871. The purpose of
the bill was to strengthen federal enforcement in the South, especially
Charles Sumner to Henry W. Longfellow (Apr. 25, 1972), reprinted in 2 SELECrED LETrERS OF
CHARLES SUMNER, supra note 127, at 585-87.
Meanwhile, Samuel Bowles, the editor of the liberal Springfield Republican, asked Henry L.
Dawes to join the liberal Republicans. "There is nothing that the people and the party yearn for
more now, than for a leader.... Our demoralization and our danger have come very much from
this lack." Letter from Samuel Bowles to Henry L. Dawes, Springfield (Sept. 22, 1871) (on file
with the Henry L. Dawes Papers, Library of Congress).
151. Later John Bigelow wrote to Whitelaw Reid from Berlin and predicted that the current
political momentum in the North allowed a replacement of Grant in the White House. He be-
lieved that Grant was still the most suitable candidate for the Republican party. He suggested
that the New York Tribune stop making "a permanent opposition to the popular choice." Letter
from John Bigelow to Whitelaw Reid (Nov. 22, 1871) (on file with the John Bigelow Papers, New
York Public Library).
152. Letter from Frederick Douglass to Cassius Clay (July 26, 1871) (on file with the Freder-
ick Douglass Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in Merline Pitre, Frederick Douglass and the
Annexation of Santo Domingo, 63 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 398 & n.42 (1977). In commenting on
Douglass's call for black voters to oppose those congressmen who had voted against the civil
rights bill or any other bill in which black interests were involved, the Chicago Tribune criticized
black voters for not having "risen to the dignity of Americans" and being "unable to speak... as
Americans, but only ex-slaves." The New Orleans Convention, Cin. TIaB., Apr. 17, 1872, at 4.
153. Before Kellogg introduced his bill (S. 791), Republicans introduced several bills into the
Senate and House to amend the first and second Enforcement Acts. Congress only considered
one of these bills (S. 793), which was proposed by Henry W. Corbett (Republican, Oregon) on a
technical amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1871) (Henry B. Anthony's
bill); id. at 59 (George Hoar's bill); id. at 318 (Frederick T. Frelinghuysen's bill, S. 438); id. at
1115 (Thomas Boles's bill); id. at 1558 (William P. Kellogg's bill, S. 791); id. (Henry W. Corbett's
bill); id. at 1773 (Hale Sypher's bill).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
in rural areas. Republican floor manager Oliver P. Morton declared
that the bill was to reinforce the high character of the third Enforce-
ment Act and "inspire as much confidence.., as may be possible.' 15 4
Senate Democrats tried to defeat the bill by tying it to an amnesty bill
then under debate. The majority of Republicans opposed the linkage
and managed to rush the bill through the Senate.155 But when the bill
reached the House for discussion on May 28, Democrats asked to
drop it, for they did "not want an army at the polls to superintend the
holding of elections.' 56 Bingham, the Republican floor manager, re-
plied that the bill was to prevent "the Ku Klux army" from going to
polls. 157 Bingham then suggested that the House consider the bill, but
many Republicans joined the Democrats and voted to not discuss the
bill, hence killing it.158
Determined to revive the Senate enforcement bills, Republicans
decided to fight back at the first opportunity. When the House Civil
Appropriation bill came to the Senate in early June for endorsement,
Kellogg sought to add his aborted enforcement plan as a rider to the
appropriation bill, to extend power and authority to judges of all fed-
eral circuit courts to supervise elections and appoint supervisors to
make arrests at polls. Kellogg made it clear that the amendment was
to "reenact" his bill, which the House had voted down a few days
before. 159 Democrats were extremely angry at the Republicans' strat-
egy. They argued that the provisions to be included were unrelated to
the appropriation bill. The verbal exchanges between the Republi-
cans and Democrats were very heated. 60 Charles Sumner for one,
154. Id. at 3320.
155. Much of the debate over the bill focused on whether the circuit or district judges would
have the power to enforce the law. For details, see id. at 3322 (statement of George Edmunds);
id. at 3322-23 (statements of Thomas Norwood and Eugene Casserly); id. at 3420 (statements of
Henry B. Anthony, Lyman Trumbull, Thomas J. Robertson, and John Sherman); id. at 3421
(statement of Charles Sumner).
156. Id. at 3934 (statement of James Beck).
157. Id.
158. The House vote took place on May 31, 1872. On the same day, the House failed to pass
another Senate bill (S. 656), which was designed to extend the tenure of the fourth section of the
Ku Klux Force Act for another congressional session. The original Ku Klux Force Act provided
that the fourth section, which empowered the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus if
necessary, would terminate after the one regular congressional session. The Senate passed the
bill on May 21, 1872, but when vote was called in the House, James A. Garfield and other
Republicans voted with the Democrats. Id. See also id. at 4103 (voting records); id. at 3432,
3931.
159. Id. at 4361.
160. All the leading Democrats and Republicans in the Senate joined the debates. For de-
tails, see id. at 4362 (statement of Allen G. Thurman); id. at 4363 (statement of Eugene Cas-
serly); id. at 4363 (statement of William Kellogg); id. at 4364 (statement of Roscoe Conkling); id.
at 4389 (statement of John Sherman).
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strongly defended the bill's legality. He said that the appropriation
was to carry out existing statutes, which included all of the enforce-
ment acts passed by Congress. He even suggested adding provisions
from his civil rights bill to the House bill. Having seen two Senate
enforcement bills defeated by House Republicans, Sumner was pessi-
mistic about the prospect of Congress passing any further force act on
black suffrage. He told his colleagues, "I trust that at this last mo-
ment, when we do seem to have it in our power to secure the equal
rights of the colored race, they will not be set aside on a
technicality.' 1 61
The bill finally passed the Senate on June 7.162 But the House
could not reach agreement. On June 8, representatives from both
Houses met again. After several hours of discussion, the Senate made
some concessions, including: first, although the bill gave power to fed-
eral judges to name deputies to supervise voting, such appointments
would not be made until requested by ten citizens (the original provi-
sions required a request from only two citizens); second, supervisors
must be appointed from the precinct where they resided; third, the
supervisors would receive no compensation except in cities of twenty
thousand inhabitants; and fourth, also the greatest, the federal mar-
shals appointed to supervise elections were to be prohibited from
making any arrests at polls in areas with less than 20,000 popula-
tion.163 James Garfield admitted that such an arrangement virtually
stripped the effectiveness of enforcement and made the presence of
federal enforcement officers at the polls merely "a moral challenge"
to the violations of the Fifteenth Amendment.164 When the report of
the last joint conference returned to the House, only Shellabarger
questioned the power of federal marshals to make arrests, the rest of
Republican majority remained silent on the issue. The bill passed the
House on June 8.165 When the final report reached the Senate, Mor-
ton challenged the last concession as to make federal supervisors "si-
lent spectators without even the power to challenge a vote." George
Edmunds, one of the Senate conferees, explained that the House in-
sisted on "having this provision put in as a means of composing their
difference in the other body." Edmunds admitted that "we were
161. Id. at 4393.
162. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 32 yeas, 11 nays and 31 not voting. Id. at 4398.
163. Id. at 4440 (report of James A. Garfield in the House); id. at 4495 (report of Cole in the
Senate).
164. Id. at 4454.
165. The House vote on the final conference report was 102 yeas, 79 nays, and 59 not voting.
Id. at 4456.
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forced to assent with a view of getting to an end."'166 Finally, the Sen-
ate accepted the report on June 10, the last day of the session.167
The enforcement rider in the Civil Appropriation Act of June 10,
1872, was virtually powerless and ineffective. It was in fact a retreat
from the previous enforcement laws. It was the product of the grow-
ing divergence between the still radical Senate and the already moder-
ate and conservative House Republicans on the issue of black
suffrage.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislation of the five enforcement laws between 1870 and
1872 demonstrates a dichotomy of political and constitutional argu-
ments within the Republican party. This dichotomy is featured with
three sets of arguments: first, the necessity to protect the civil and
political rights of black Americans vs. the breach of the tenets of tradi-
tional constitutionalism; second, the necessity to expand federal au-
thority to enforce the federal laws vs. the possibility that such
expansion would take away rights reserved to the states and create a
centralized federal government and lead to political corruption; third,
the necessity to protect the rights of newly enfranchised black Ameri-
cans vs. the fear that such protection would damage and abridge the
rights of white Americans. These arguments ultimately led to a single
question: how far should the federal government go to enforce black
suffrage and the Civil War amendments.
Ideologically, radical Republicans viewed the enforcement of
black suffrage as both a political necessity and an obligation of the
federal government. Federal enforcement was crucial to stabilizing
and sustaining Republican control at both the national and state
levels, which was in their view an indispensable political guarantee of
the nation's general interests. This was neither an ideological miscon-
ception of the party nor merely its pretext for expediency. It was a
belief that had evolved historically from the events of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, through which the strength and possibility of the
national government was tested. The Civil War and Reconstruction
reactivated the potential of the national government, as the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments being added to the
original Constitution. These Amendments gave the nation a new
political life, the national government new responsibilities, and the
166. Id. at 4495.
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Republican party a new mission: to establish and consolidate a na-
tional government immune from being again put into the danger of
the tragic Civil War. Thus, for radical-minded Republicans, Recon-
struction was a continuation of the confrontation between the Union
and Confederacy. Making enforcement laws was a work to define the
"new birth of freedom" and to defend the war achievements including
the party's control of power. Under this circumstance, black suffrage
was both an object of defense and a weapon of defense.
The more conservative and moderate Republicans took black suf-
frage with caution and, perhaps, suspicion. They were not as confi-
dent as their radical counterparts in black men's political capacity.
They accepted black emancipation and enfranchisement as legitimate
results of the war, but they were not prepared for the drastic change
of the traditional federal-state relations. These Republicans shared
Democratic fears that the unlimited expansion of the federal govern-
ment power could damage the state governments and that the na-
tional government's power could be abused by unscrupulous
politicians. For them, a comprehensive enforcement of black political
and civil rights could fundamentally change the nature of the Ameri-
can polity, and break the checks and balances between federal and
state powers. They were deeply troubled by the prospect that unqual-
ified suffrage, as aided by federal enforcement, would turn the tradi-
tional republican form of government of free and independent men
into a democracy of ignorance and alienation.
These ideological differences were not the only dividing line by
which individual Republicans in Congress were labelled "radical,"
"moderate," or "conservative." In fact, except for Charles Sumner
and a few other whose records were consistent, many Republicans had
carried with them simultaneously the above mentioned political out-
looks. They could be "radical" in discussing once enforcement bill
and be "moderate" or "conservative" at the debate for a different bill,
or switch positions when the same bill was discussed. Political outlook
was not the sole factor that affected the decision making of the
Republicans. In effect, because the geographical, economic, and polit-
ical interests represented by the party members were so diverse, many
Republicans had to make decisions on grounds other than the party's
proclaimed principles.
But, despite all of the ideological confusion and divisive political
and economic interests, the Republicans managed to push through
five enforcement laws in a short period of two years. In spite of all the
suspicions and infighting, as the voting records show, the majority of
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the party stood with the party. What held the party together was not
merely the party's proclaimed principles for justice and equality, or
the desire to punish the former enemies, or partisan interests, but all
of these added together. The Republicans were not political angels
and they wanted the enforcement laws to meet the party's pragmatic
need to win elections in the North and to protect the black voters in
the South. But at the time, the party's need for self-preservation and
expansion was indisputably associated with doing justice to black
Americans, defining the contents of Civil War amendments, construct-
ing a healthy system of national elections, and expanding federal gov-
ernment's functions in protecting citizens' rights. The enforcement
laws carried with them these mixed goals. It is in this context that the
Republicans and their enforcement acts deserve credit for consolidat-
ing the political results of the Civil War and opening new possibilities
for American democracy.
